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NOTES 
Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the 
Armed Career Criminal Act 
Some criminals will not mend their ways.1 Authorities find that 
these "career criminals"2 commit most of the serious crime in the 
United States.3 In recent years, the criminal justice system has re-
sponded specifically to the problems posed by incorrigible felons. Law 
enforcement agencies have developed and implemented special pro-
1. For an illustration, see Leo, A Criminal Lack of Common Sense, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Aug. 21, 1989, at 56 (recounting the 32-year criminal career of an incorrigible, violent 
sex offender and the repeated failures of the California criminal justice system to stop him). 
2. Lawmakers and judges use a variety of labels, largely synonymous, to describe this group 
of offenders: career criminals, career offenders, habitual offenders, repeat offenders, recidivists. 
See, e.g., United States v. Belton, 890 F.2d 9, 10 (7th Cir. 1989) (interchangeable use of terms 
"career offender'' and "career criminal"); see also Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearings on H.R. 
1627 and S.52 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 10, 17-18, 31, 64 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings] (interchangeable use of various labels 
during hearings on career criminal legislation). 
Generally, career criminals are people who repeatedly commit serious crimes and fail to re-
spond to treatment. See, e.g., Belton, 890 F.2d at 10 (Judge Posner's definition: "A career crimi-
nal is incorrigible, undeterrable, recidivating, unresponsive to the 'specific deterrence' of having 
been previously convicted •.•• "). Some criminologists have ventured a typology within the 
broader class of career criminals. Skilled professional criminals who make their living at crime 
are labeled "intensives," or "heavies." Others are "intermittents," or "losers," who tend to be 
opportunistic and often "oblivious to the risks and consequences of their criminal acts." See J. 
PETBRSIUA, P. GREENWOOD & M. LAVIN, CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL FELONS x-xi, 
152-55 (1978) [hereinafter J. PBTBRSIUA]. The patterns of individual criminals' careers, how-
ever, tend to be random and unpredictable, often defying any neat typology. See S. MILLER, S. 
DINITZ & ]. CoNRAD, CAREERS OF TIIB VIOLENT 215-16 (1982). 
3. The landmark study is M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A 
BIRTH CoHORT (1972) [hereinafter M. WOLFGANG]. Having studied the criminal records of 
10,000 young males born in Philadelphia in 1945, the authors found that those "chronic offend-
ers" who committed five or more offenses (627 or 18% of all delinquents) had committed a total 
of 5,305 offenses - 51.9% of all crimes committed by the cohort's delinquents. Id. at 88; see also 
R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 215 (1970) (80% of all felonies committed by repeaters); M. 
PETERSON, H. BRAlKBR & s. POLICH, WHO CoMMITS CRIMBs 186-88 (1981) (reporting that 
25% of the sampled offenders committed 58% of offenders' armed robberies, 46% of their as-
saults, and 65% of their burglaries); K. WILLIAMS, THE SCOPE AND PREDICTION OF REcmI-
VISM 5-6 (1979) (30% of defendants in study accounted for 56% of total arrests). Conviction 
data, however, do not sufficiently describe the extent of the harm career criminals cause. Many 
commit scores of crimes in addition to those for which they are caught and punished. See J. 
PBTBRSILIA, supra note 2, at vii (previously convicted inmates in confidential study self-reported 
commission of over 20 crimes per year of "street time"); see also M. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 12 
(1984) (same). Congress has heard and acted on this data. See generally Hearings, supra note 2, 
at 12 (Remarks of Senator Arlen Specter: "It need not be repeated, the tremendous problem 
caused by the career criminals, where some 6 percent of the criminals in this country account for 
some 70 percent of the crime •... "); id. at 37 (Remarks of Congressman Wyden: "[S]tudies 
show that less than 10 percent of the criminal population commits more than two thirds of all 
violent crime in America."). 
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grams aimed at career criminals,4 and nearly all states have enacted 
habitual-offender laws that increase prison terms for recidivists.5 In 
the past decade, the federal government has entered the fray. 
The Armed Career Criminal Act of 19846 (ACCA) enables the 
federal government to help state authorities more effectively prosecute 
"career criminals.''7 The ACCA imposes a mandatory sentence of at 
least fifteen years, and up to life imprisonment, for illegal possession of 
4. See W. GAY & R. BoWERS, TARGETING LAW ENFORCEMENT REsoURCES 1-26 (1985) 
(reviewing existing career criminal programs and instructing police agencies on how to develop 
such programs); Crovitz, In Detroit, a Prosecutor Makes Street Crime a Federal Case, Wall St. J., 
Nov. 7, 1990, at A15, col. 3 (describing Detroit program coordinating state and federal police 
and prosecution efforts against the "fewer than 2,500 criminals • • • responsible for the over-
whelming majority of violent crime and drug trafficking'' in Detroit). 
5. See L. SLEFFEL, THE LAW AND THE DANGEROUS CRIMINAL 1 (1977) (survey of state 
recidivist statutes; most states have one or more in effect); Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reduc-
ing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REv. 511, 511 n.2 (1982) (as of 1979, 
44 states had recidivist statutes in effect). 
6. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was originally codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 
§ 1202(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The ACCA was amended and recodified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e) by the Career Criminal Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 459 
(Supp. IV 1986) (expanding the range of predicate convictions from robbery and burglary in the 
1984 version to include any "violent felony or serious drug offense"). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 1056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4462 (1988) amended the original ACCA 
by adding language requiring that the predicate offenses be "committed on occasions different 
from one another." 
Presently, the ACCA is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). It provides: 
(e)(l) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous 
convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(l) of this title for a violent felony or a 
serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such per-
son shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or 
grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 
922(g), and such person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence imposed 
under this subsection. 
(2) As used in this subsection -
(A) the term "serious drug offense" means -
(i) an offense under the Controlled Substance Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the 
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.) or the 
first section or section 3 of Public Law 96-350 (21 U.S.C. 955a et seq.) for 
which a maximum term of ten years or more is prescribed by law; or 
(ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possess-
ing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as de-
fined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for 
which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed 
by law; and 
(B) the term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying 
of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment 
for such term if committed by an adult, that -
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another; or 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another. 
(C) the term "conviction" includes a finding that a person has committed an act of 
juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony. 
7. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 10. 
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a firearm.8 by anyone who has three prior convictions for violent felo-
nies or serious drug offenses "committed on occasions different from 
one another."9 The ACCA provides in part: 
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title [which 
criminalizes possession of firearms by felons] and has three previous con-
victions by any court ... for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or 
both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person 
shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years and, notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, 
or grant a probationary sentence to, such person ... and such person 
shall not be eligible for parole •... 10 
To apply the ACCA, judges must determine first whether the defen-
dant's prior convictions meet the definitions of "violent felony or seri-
ous drug offense," and secondly whether the offenses were committed 
on different occasions so that they count separately toward armed ca-
reer criminal status. This Note focuses on the latter analysis - con-
viction counting. 
The ACCA implements a policy of "selective incapacitation."11 
That is, it singles out a special class of offenders for long periods of 
incarceration. To the extent that the criminal justice system identifies 
some criminals as unresponsive to rehabilitative treatment or deter-
rence, and expects them to offend again, the case for incapacitating 
them - denying them the opportunity to commit crimes by locking 
them up for long periods of time - is especially strong.12 If the gov-
8. Federal law prohibits convicted felons from possessing a firearm which has been shipped 
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce (which is tantamount to all firearms). 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g) (1988) provides in part: 
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person -
(1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year; 
... to ship or transport ... or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammuni· 
tion •... 
9. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988). 
10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988). For the full text of the ACCA, see supra note 6. 
11. See M. GoTIFREDSON & T. HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 259-65 (1990); P. 
GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982); Note, supra note 5. 
12. On the crime-reduction rationale supporting selective incapacitation policy, see P. 
GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, supra note 11, at 30-31; M. MALTZ, supra note 3, at 11-13; 
Note, supra note 5, at 512. Crime reduction is not the only justification for sentence enhance-
ment for career criminals. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 571 (1967) (Warren, C.J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that recidivist statutes serve both incapacita-
tion and retribution objectives); cf. SENTENCING 187-301 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981) 
(exploring the relationship between sentencing policy and the goals of the criminal law); Hart, 
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958). The purposes of the 
criminal law are complex and interrelated. Implicit in the concept of "career criminals" is the 
notion that since they are remorseless, and thus incapable of experiencing useful punishment, 
they are probably beyond hope of deterrence or rehabilitation. The remaining goals of the crimi-
nal law, such as "the disablement of offenders [incapacitation], the sharpening of the commu-
nity's sense of right and wrong, and the satisfaction of the community's sense of just retribution," 
can still be served if career criminals serve long sentences. Hart, supra, at 401. In sentence 
enhancement legislation these goals are clearly paramount. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988). 
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ernment cannot expect to change these criminals' behavior, it can at 
least isolate them and thereby protect society from their future 
crimes.13 In recent years, Congress and state legislatures have at-
tempted to accomplish precisely that. A number of federal sentencing 
laws enacted during the past decade impose enhanced sentences on 
repeat offenders.14 
The ACCA identifies career criminals on the basis of their prior 
criminal records; it reaches those with the prescribed number and type 
of prior convictions. Other federal incapacitation statutes operate in 
similar ways. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines),15 
13. See Note, supra note 5, at 512 (explaining rationale for incapacitation policy). The ability 
to predict future criminality is a much debated subject. Several authorities deny the ability to 
predict future criminal conduct in individual cases without unacceptably high rates of error. See 
generally 3 AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE§ 18-3.2, at 223 
& n.8 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (high rates of error common); S. KLEIN & 
M. CAGGIANO, THE PREVALENCE, PREDICTABILITY, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RECIDI-
VISM 37 (1986) (five recognized predictive models proved only 5 to 10% more accurate than 
mere chance in predicting postrelease crime commission); M. MALTZ, supra note 3, at 12 (pre-
dictions based on routinely collected criminal justice data showed over 50% misclassification 
error); Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 24, 46 (1971) (high rates of error common); von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct 
and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 717, 727 (1972) (same); 
Note, supra note 5, at 514-15 & n.21 (collecting studies showing error rates in predicting future 
violent crime between 54 and 99%). Others assert that recidivism is predictable with sufficient 
accuracy to justify its use in reaching policy decisions. See, e.g., P. SCHMIDT & A. WHITE, AN 
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 365-73 (1984) (overprediction error just 2.5%, n 
"marked improvement over most previous attempts to predict recidivism"); E. VAN DEN HAAG, 
PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CoNCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 251 (1975) (re-
cidivism predictable with "a high degree of probability"). 
Importantly, most of these studies have not confined their samples to offenders previously 
convicted of three serious offenses. Error rates in analyses of first-time or second-time offenders 
do not necessarily undermine the validity of classifications mnde under the ACCA. Indeed, 
Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin found that the likelihood of recidivism increases ns the number of 
prior convictions increases - the percentage of those with five prior offenses who commit a sixth 
crime is greater than the percentage of those with one prior offense who commit n second, and so 
on. M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3, at 65-70. Although Gottfredson and Hirschi argue against the 
selective incapacitation of youthful offenders early in their careers, they note that "[a]t some 
point, of course, almost any policy will suggest that multiple recidivists merit incarceration [for 
long terms]." M. GoTTFREDSON & T. HIRSCHI, supra note 11, at 264. The ACCA, of course, 
defines that point as three previous violent or serious drug offenses. 
14. Especially in the past 15 years, Congress hns passed a number of statutes toughening 
federal sentencing policy. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3551 (Supp. 1991), 
completely redesign federal sentencing policy. See infra Parts III and IV; see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3147 (1988) (enhanced sentence for offenses committed while released on bail); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b) (1988) (enhanced sentences for certain drug offenders). Since 1984, often to the chagrin 
of federal judges who believe these laws work terrible injustice in some cases, each election year 
has seen "mandatory minimum sentences ..• ratcheted upward in a drug-warring frenzy." See 
Taylor, Ten Years for Two Ounces, AM. LAW., Mar. 1990, at 68. 
15. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West Supp. 1991). The Guidelines apply to 90% of all felony and 
Oass A misdemeanor cases in federal court. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, Ch. 1, Pt. A.5 (West Supp. 
1991) (Introduction and General Application Principles). This Note addresses the interaction 
between the Guidelines and the ACCA, so a basic explanation of the Guidelines is in order. In 
cases under the Guidelines, judges determine sentences based on two factors: the offense level 
and the criminal history category. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § lBl.1 (West Supp. 1991). 
Chapter Two of the Guidelines contains a series of crime-specific sections that tell judges how 
to compute the offense level. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 §§ lBl.l(b), 2Al.1-2X5.1 (West Supp. 1991). 
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which control most federal sentencing decisions, contain a "career of-
fender" provision which enhances the sentences of recidivists with 
qualifying conviction records.16 As they do when applying the 
Each specific crime has a "base offense level" which applies generically, and additional instruc-
tions to raise or lower the offense level by a certain amount if certain aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances occurred ("specific offense characteristics"). 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § lBl.l(b) (West 
Supp. 1991). Thus, for the crime of kidnapping,§ 2A4.1 specifies a base offense level of24, and 
directs the judge to increase the offense level to 28 if the victim "sustained permanent injury," 
and by another two levels, to 30, ifa "dangerous weapon" was used. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § 2A4.1 
(West Supp. 1991). 
Chapter Four of the Guidelines provides the rules for computing the second factor, the crimi-
nal history category. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 §§ lBl.l(f), 4Al.1-4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991). To sim-
plify, the judge assesses the defendant a certain amount of "points" based on the number and 
length of the defendant's prior sentences, and whether the instant crime was committed while on 
parole or escape status or soon after release. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § 4Al.1 (West Supp. 1991). If, 
for example, the kidnapper above had four prior sentences of more than one year, he would be 
assessed three points for each of them, for a total of 12. And, if the kidnapping had been com-
mitted within two years of release from prison, the judge would add an additional two points, 
raising the total to 14. Different point scores translate to one of the six criminal history catego-
ries (I-VI); fourteen "points" translates to category VI, the highest one. See 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 
§ 4Al.1 & Ch. 5, Pt. A (West Supp. 1991) (Commentary and Sentencing Table). 
The judge uses the offense level and criminal history category to determine the appropriate 
sentencing range, expressed in months, from the Sentencing Table. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § lBl.l(g) 
& Ch. 5, Pt. A (West Supp. 1991). The table is reproduced in part below: 
SENTENCING TABLE 
Criminal History Category 
Offense I II III IV v VI 
Level (0-1) (2-3) (4,5,6) (7,8,9) (10,11,12) (13 or more) 
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7 
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9 
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188 
30 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-265 
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 
At the intersection of each criminal history category (columns I-VI) and offense level (43 total 
rows), the table prescribes the permissible sentencing range. Thus, for a kidnapper with an of-
fense level of 30 and a criminal history category of VI (14 points), the sentencing range is 168-
210 months imprisonment (bold type). Judges may impose sentences outside the prescribed 
range only in limited, unusual circumstances. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 Ch. l, Pt. A.2 (West Supp. 
1991) (Introduction) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)). By structuring the sentencing analysis 
in this way, the Guidelines seek to curtail the tremendous discretion that formerly marked fed-
eral sentencing decisions and resulted in wide disparities. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 ch. 1, pt. A.3 (West 
Supp. 1991). The foregoing explanation greatly simplifies the Guidelines in the interest of 
quickly explaining the interaction of the offense level and criminal history to produce the sen-
tence. Those aspects bear directly on the Guidelines' treatment of career offenders and the inter-
face between the Guidelines and the ACCA. See infra Parts III and IV. 
16. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.3 (West Supp. 1991). The Career Offender provision enhances 
sentences by mandating the highest criminal history category (VI) and higher offense levels than 
those that would normally apply (e.g .• the offense level becomes 37 for all offenses with a statu-
tory maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and becomes 32 where the instant offense carries a 
statutory maximum of 20 years). 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § 4Bl.l (West Supp. 1991). The actual 
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ACCA, courts applying the Guidelines must determine whether prior 
convictions count separately toward sentence enhancement.17 Similar 
issues therefore arise when courts count prior convictions under the 
ACCA and the Guidelines. is 
To implement the ACCA, prosecutors and judges must apply the 
statute's criminal history standard to accurately distinguish career 
criminals from ordinary offenders.19 The ACCA directs judges to en-
hance the sentence of ex-felons convicted of illegal possession of a fire-
arm whenever the defendant has three previous convictions for violent 
felonies or serious drug offenses committed on occasions different from 
one another. This standard, when satisfied, triggers mandatory sen-
tence enhancement - the ACCA does not allow parole, probation, or 
suspended sentences.20 If courts interpret the standard too narrowly 
and fail to identify a large number of offenders who will in fact commit 
serious crimes again, the law will have little effect on crime.21 On the 
other hand, if courts interpret the standard too broadly and capture 
offenders who probably would not commit serious crimes again -
"false positives" who are not really career criminals22 - then other 
problems will result. Judges will sentence misclassified offenders to 
unjustly harsh terms,23 which will further stretch prison resources for 
no good reason. 
Some commentators question whether an examination of prior 
conviction history alone should suffice to classify individuals as career 
criminals. Many think the judge should attempt a broader or more 
rigorous analysis of each offender before the court.24 For example, 
judges could examine facts underlying the prior crimes: the degree of 
violence involved, the relationship of the offender to the victims, or 
similarities between offenses. The judge might also consider the per-
sentence still comes from the sentencing table; the court simply applies the higher category and 
level to find it in the table. 
17. See infra Parts III-IV. 
18. Id. 
19. See M. GOTIFREDSON & T. HmscHI, supra note 11, at 259. No test or standard will be 
completely accurate. See supra note 13. 
20. 18 U.S.C. § 924{e)(l) (1988). 
21. For example, an early version of the ACCA would have limited the predicate offenses to 
violations of federal law such as bank robbery. Congress ultimately rejected that version as un-
derinclusive. Critics successfully argued that such a standard would emasculate the ACCA be-
cause the law would reach only a few criminals, Le., 10% of the total armed robbers and none of 
the burglars. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 38. 
22. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
23. Some federal judges protest that recently passed federal mandatory minimum sentencing 
laws enhancing the sentences of certain drug offenders force courts to impose absurdly long 
sentences on false positives. "Most are undoubtedly real criminals. But many are marginal play-
ers with no prior criminal records - lookouts, drivers, 'mules.' " See Taylor, supra note 14, at 
68. Even though all ACCA defendants, by definition, have prior criminal records, fears of this 
sort are not completely allayed when the ACCA is applied. See infra Part II. 
24. See infra note 50. 
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sonal characteristics of the offenders: whether the defendants made 
their living from crime, whether they demonstrate remorse, or the na-
ture of their prior treatment. Other commentators, however, argue 
that the conviction history alone provides the better test.25 
Another problem with the ACCA test appears with its practical 
application. In close cases, the phrase "occasions different from one 
another" proves ambiguous. It is unclear how Congress intended 
judges to count convictions for offenses occurring within a short time 
span - multiple burglaries on a single night, for example. The of-
fenses could qualify as separate "occasions," each counting toward the 
requisite three, or they could be considered part of a single criminal 
occasion and thus count as a single conviction. 26 The text of the 
ACCA does not specify the elapsed time between offenses necessary to 
delineate separately countable "occasions." Similarly, the ACCA does 
not specify whether nontemporal factors such as a common criminal 
scheme or a common victim matter to the determination of separate 
occasions. 
A problem thus arises because three-time offenders can differ dra-
matically in ways intuitively relevant to the determination whether or 
not they are "career" criminals. Some defendants, for example, have 
made round trips through the system - arrested, tried, convicted, and 
punished - on three or more successive occasions. They more 
strongly demonstrate resistance to treatment than those who have 
served a single jail sentence. Defendants with a history of offenses 
spanning several years more convincingly demonstrate a career of 
crime than do those with a history of only three crimes committed 
within a few weeks of one another.27 
25. See infra section l.B. 
26. The word "occasion" is ambiguous here. One definition of "occasion" is "a situation or 
set of circumstances favorable to a particular purpose," WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1560 (1986), which suggests same-night burglaries might be a single occa-
sion. Alternately, "occasion" may be "a particular time at which something takes place," id., 
suggesting successive burglaries happen on different occasions. 
27. The problem is best illustrated by two hypothetical examples not too far removed from 
actual cases that have come before the courts. Compare United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 
(9th Cir. 1987) (same-night burglaries), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988) with United States v. 
Uzelac, 921 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1990) (conviction based on possession of hunting weapons) and 
United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). Suppose Defendant One has a 
history that shows, in Year One, a robbery conviction and six months probation; in Year Three, a 
burglary conviction and six months in prison; and in Year Five, two convictions under one in-
dictment for armed robberies committed one week apart, resulting in concurrent prison sentences 
of four years. In Year Nine, the defendant is convicted for an armed robbery, as well as for 
possession of a sawed-off shotgun and pistol found in the trunk of the car. Clearly, Congress 
intended for this offender to be sentenced to at least 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act. The test - three or more convictions for serious crimes on different occasions - does not 
give pause. This defendant is the stereotypical armed recidivist who has been through the "re-
volving door'' of the criminal justice system. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
Legal and moral problems arise when the ACCA defendant seems less threatening. See supra 
note 23. Suppose Defendant Two was convicted in Year One for burglary of a warehouse and 
immediately released on probation. Weeks later, a single indictment results in two convictions 
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Where defendants' conviction records leave serious doubt about 
whether they are in fact career criminals, some courts balk at sending 
them to jail for fifteen years. These courts have developed approaches 
to conviction counting that avoid application of the Act in all but the 
most egregious cases.28 Critics find these approaches excessively leni-
ent and underinclusive; they fail to capture criminals whom Congress 
fully intended to incapacitate. 29 Other courts enhance the sentence of 
virtually any defendant whose predicate offenses occurred at distinct 
times, even if only hours apart. 3° Critics argue that these courts em-
ploy overly mechanical definitions that lead to draconian sentences for 
criminals who are almost certainly outside the small class of "career 
criminals" which Congress targeted in the ACCA.31 Between these 
two approaches, some courts attempt to group related crimes into 
criminal "episodes."32 Since the statute does not define criminal epi-
sodes, these courts effectively reintroduce discretion into the applica-
tion of a mandatory sentencing law - one designed fundamentally to 
limit judicial discretion. 33 
However troublesome the ACCA's language, Congress has articu-
lated a prior-conviction-based test to identify career criminals and 
commanded the courts to apply it at sentencing. Courts should inter-
pret and apply such a concept uniformly to achieve fairness. 34 As de-
scribed above, courts sometimes fail to do so with respect to 
for burglarizing adjacent apartments on the same night, and a jail term of several months. For 
the succeeding five years, his record shows not so much as a traffic citation. Then, in Year Six, 
defendant is arrested in a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms crackdown. Defendant is 
convicted for illegal possession of a hunting rifle, a gift from an employer. See Gonzalez, Traf-
ficker's High-Powered Guns Put ATF in Middle of Drug Fight, Wash. Times, Dec. 20, 1989, at 
BS, col. 1. Fifteen years without parole - the mandatory minimum sentence if defendant is 
sentenced under the ACCA and its conviction counting test is literally applied - seems very 
harsh in such a case. 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989) (requiring intervening 
convictions between offenses; see infra section 11.B.3). 
29. See, e.g., 873 F.2d at 685-88 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). 
30. See, e.g., Wicks, 833 F.2d at 192 (relying on the distinction in time to count same-night 
burglaries separately; see infra section 11.B.1). 
31. See, e.g., 833 F.2d at 194-95 (Pregerson, J. dissenting). 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989), (considering selected facts 
underlying the crimes to group them into separate "episodes"; see infra section 11.B), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989). 
33. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 18-4.4, at 285 (mandatory sentencing laws represent 
legislature's attempts to curtail judicial discretion); see also infra note 156 and section 11.B.2, 
discussing the discretion that arises in the criminal episodes approach. 
34. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, Ch. 4, Pt. A.3 (West Supp. 1991) (Introduction to Guidelines); 
see also Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2154-55 (1990). Ambiguous terms in criminal 
statutes should be interpreted consistently to ensure uniform results in factually similar cases. 
The problem has surfaced in parts of the ACCA other than the conviction counting problem. 
The ambiguity of the term "burglary" in the ACCA - whether "breaking and entering" counts 
as a "burglary," for example - also created disagreement between the circuits until resolved in 
Taylor. 
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conviction counting under the ACCA. 35 The various approaches to 
conviction counting should be reconciled: (1) to conform judicial ap-
plication of the law to probable congressional intent; (2) to improve 
the uniformity of results between the federal circuits in factually simi-
lar cases; and (3) to bring the ACCA in accord with other federal 
sentencing law, especially the more recent U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines. 36 
This Note suggests an interpretation of the ACCA which achieves 
these goals. Part I examines the legislative history of the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act relevant to the conviction counting problem. Part 
II explores the different approaches courts take in counting prior con-
victions under the ACCA. Part III analyzes the "career offender" 
concept and the conviction counting method recently articulated in 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a much more comprehensive ex-
pression of federal sentencing policy than the Armed Career Criminal 
Act. Part IV proposes that courts draw heavily on the Guidelines' 
conviction counting principles when applying the ACCA. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The history of the ACCA supports some limited conclusions as to 
how Congress intended the courts to count convictions. Part I exam-
ines these conclusions in detail. First, interpretations should not nar-
row the reach of the ACCA so much as to sacrifice prosecutorial 
leverage. Second, interpretations should not require individualized 
factfinding, nor should they involve unfettered judicial discretion. Fi-
nally, the history supports the conclusion that Congress did not neces-
sarily intend that a conviction history must demonstrate repeated 
rehabilitative failures for the convictions to be counted separately. 
The Armed Career Criminal Act was enacted in 1984 and 
amended in 1986 and 1988.37 Courts searching for the precise mean-
ing of the phrase "committed on occasions different from one another" 
find no clear answer in the Act's legislative history.38 Still, the legisla-
tive evidence of the Act's purposes and intended operation provides 
some helpful clues. 
A. The Leveraging Principle 
Congress intended the ACCA to add the power of the Federal 
Government to the efforts of local prosecutors in dealing with habitual 
criminals. The principal sponsors believed the ACCA would bolster 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. 18 u.s.c. § 3553 (1988). 
37. See supra note 6. 
38. See z"nfra Part II. 
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local prosecution efforts through the principle of "leveraging":39 
The primary benefit of this legislation will not be the federal prosecu-
tion of criminals, but the leverage that the threat of federal prosecution 
will give state prosecutions. The threat by the state prosecutor to move a 
repeat offender's case to the federal level - where trials are conducted 
on the average four times faster than in crowded state courts and where 
the defendant would face a mandatory 15 year sentence - would signifi-
cantly cut down on the growing tendency of defendants [in state court] 
to file one delaying motion after another and otherwise attempt to cir-
cumvent the state judicial process [such as by judge-shopping].40 
Ideally, prosecutors would exercise their discretion to seek enhanced 
sentencing in federal court for only a few of their cases.41 The threat 
of prosecution under the ACCA, however, would inspire all potential 
ACCA defendants to agree to guilty pleas with stiffer sentences.42 
The leverage concept bears on the conviction counting problem be-
cause it mitigates against narrowing the reach of the ACCA. Congress 
expected prosecutorial discretion to limit significantly the number of 
cases actually prosecuted under the ACCA.43 Congress envisioned 
only the more egregious cases as proper federal fodder.44 Congress 
intended, however, that courts interpret the ACCA in such a way that 
it could be used as a threat against a much greater number of repeat 
offenders than those actually prosecuted. Interpretations narrowing 
the reach of the ACCA diminish the credibility of this threat. For 
example, to require incarceration between convictions would remove 
39. Hearings, supra note 2, at 10. 
40. Id. at 19 (remarks of Sen. Specter). 
41. Id. at 15. 
42. Id. at 13. 
43. The chief Senate sponsor, Senator Arlen Specter, explained the anticipated effect of the 
legislation in terms of his experience as a Philadelphia prosecutor: 
[The ACCA] could be a centerpiece [of a federal effort to fight crime] by providing leverage 
for state prosecutors . 
• . • [As a district attorney] I had some 500 career criminals on the docket • • • • Wit· 
nesses would disappear, or memories would dim, or •.• they could work a plea bargain and, 
notwithstanding a record of 5, 6, 7 armed robberies, 7, 8, 9, 10 burglaries, walk out of court 
with probation •.. again, and again, and again over my strenuous protests ••• because the 
judge shopping and moves for continuance were simply beyond the power of that judicial 
system to control. 
.•. [If prosecution under the ACCA] happened to a few of Philadelphia's career 
criminals, there would be a mass rush for guilty pleas in the State courts, and ••• it is not 
[overly] optimistic to predict that 300 or 400 of the balance of those 500 cases would result 
in guilty pleas, and not with sentences of 15 years to life but with sentences of 10 years, or 12 
years, much more than is being obtained at the present time. It is that leveraging which we 
really seek to accomplish through the career criminal bill. 
Id. at 13 (emphasis added); see also id. at 37 (remarks of the principal House sponsor, Rep. Ron 
Wyden) ("Perhaps most important, this bill will give local prosecutors leverage."). 
44. Prosecutors, who have wide discretion whether or not to prosecute recidivists under sen-
tence enhancement laws, would determine which cases warranted ACCA prosecution. See id. at 
13; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 18-4.4, at 285 n.35. In the states' experience, mandatory 
sentencing laws have been characterized as merely transferring discretion from judges (who for-
merly sentenced as they saw fit) to prosecutors (who continue to charge as they see fit). See Id., 
§ 18-4.4, at 285; M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 1-13 (1973), 
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from consideration any prior offenses that resulted in probation or sus-
pended terms. Fortuitous prior treatment would operate as a license 
to offend again with confidence that the ACCA could not apply. The 
leverage concept mitigates against such a narrow reading of the con-
viction counting language. 
Although the broadest possible interpretation of the ACCA 45 
would maximize leverage, competing considerations recognized by 
Congress46 - administrative efficiency, the appropriate role of judicial 
discretion, and avoiding arguably unjust sentences in anomalous cases, 
for example - lead to judicial interpretations that narrow the reach of 
the ACCA in varying degrees.47 Any sound interpretation should per-
mit justifiable results in close cases. At the same time, the ACCA 
should cause nearly all three-time offenders to worry - they should 
not be certain it cannot apply to them. 
B. Accuracy Versus Equity: The Proper Scope of the Inquiry 
Plainly, some judges think that the "mere" fact of three prior felo-
nies, without more, does not a career criminal make. They hesitate,48 
or simply refuse, 49 to send someone to jail for fifteen years on that 
basis alone. They would examine a defendant's history in more depth 
than the text of the ACCA requires before identifying them as career 
criminals. so 
45. See infra section 11.B.1. 
46. See, e.g., infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
47. See infra sections 11.B.2 & 3. 
48. E.g., United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 684 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J. concurring) 
("[W]e must insist that the government prove convincingly that the crimes (and the episodes of 
which they were part) were truly separate."). The hesitation is understandable in part because 
mandatory fifteen·years·to-life sentences are so severe. Prior to enactment, the ABA warned that 
mandatory (ACCA) sentences far out of proportion to the crime might violate the constitutional 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Hearings. supra note 2, at 79. So far, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has disagreed, upholding some very stiff mandatory sentences for recidivists. 
See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (Sentence of life imprisonment for three felony 
bad check offenses under the Texas state recidivist statute did not violate eighth amendment.); 
see also Note, The Anned Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?, 
56 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 1085, 1094 nn.58·62 (1988). 
49. See, e.g., Balascsak. 873 F.2d at 683-84 (rejecting the statutory test, "committed on occa-
sions different from one another," and refusing to enhance the sentence unless the conviction 
history showed three rehabilitative failures in the form of intervening convictions). 
50. Because courts have access to plenty of conflicting testimony, virtually any possible con-
struction of the conviction counting language in the ACCA can find some support in the record. 
See Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2160 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the 
various contradictory views in the legislative record of the ACCA); see also United States v. 
Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he legislative history, like the statute itself, is 
ambiguous."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070 (1989). 
The committee testimony of the Assistant U.S. Attorney General of the Criminal Division, 
Department of Justice, Mr. Stephen S. Trott, supports several competing views on conviction 
counting. Trott described the class of offenders that he felt should be targeted for mandatory 
minimum sentences: 
These are people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their definition, that locking them 
up and letting them go doesn't do any good. They go on again, you lock them up, you let 
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The legislative history, however, strongly supports the notion that 
judges applying the ACCA should confine their identification inquiry 
to the conviction record - that is, to the description of prior offenses, 
dates of conviction, and treatment.51 Many criminologists studying 
recidivism attempt to predict future criminality.52 They construct 
models that invariably examine several factors in addition to the 
number and type of prior offenses - age and socioeconomic status, for 
example - that tend to predict recidivism. 53 Error rates in these 
models can be quite substantial; even the better models achieve only 
seventy percent accuracy. 54 In stark contrast to the broad, multifactor 
analysis that marks academic efforts, the ACCA as written classifies 
career criminals based on a much na"ower set of facts - number, 
type, and timing of prior convictions. While even the most rigorous 
scientific models misclassify significant numbers of offenders, Congress 
wrote the ACCA to consider even less information than do scientific 
them go, it doesn't do any good, they are back for a third time. At that juncture, we should 
say, "That's it; time out; it is all over. We, as responsible people, will never give you the 
opportunity to do this again." 
Hearings, supra note 2, at 64. Judge Pregerson, dissenting from the majority's straightforward 
reading of the ACCA in Wicks, quoted the above portion of the Trott testimony verbatim, and 
then concluded 
Thus, it is clear that [the ACCA] is aimed at recidivists, not at individuals who commit 
three acts that result in three convictions. 
I would ••• hold that something more than three convictions is required •••• Here, 
where two of the three convictions stemmed from burglaries that occurred on the same 
night, I would hold that [the ACCA] was not intended to, and therefore does not, apply. 
United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 195 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988). The 
Trott quotation plausibly suggests that witness Trott envisi911ed three complete, successive cycles 
through the system. "[L]ocking them up and letting them go doesn't do any good •••• [T]hey are 
back for a third time" seems to describe three successive cycles of offense, conviction, incarcern· 
tion, and release. Perhaps that is the "something more" Judge Pregerson would require to count 
the convictions separately, since it would prove the defendant was, in his words, "resistant to 
society's efforts at rehabilitation." 833 F.2d at 195. 
However, Trott's testimony, taken as a whole, hardly supports Judge Pregerson's reluctance 
to take the language at face value. In the next sentence after the passage quoted, Trott stated that 
he felt a mandatory life sentence should be imposed on armed repeat offenders with histories such 
as Wicks: "I have always believed for people who use firearms, who have demonstrated their 
proclivities by a couple of convictions, that they should go away forever." Hearings, supra note 2, 
at 64 (emphasis added). 
51. In general, courts agree that the ACCA is designed to be easy for judges to apply. No 
elaborate factfinding is contemplated at the sentence enhancement stage. See Taylor v. United 
States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2160 (1990) ("We think the only plausible interpretation of [the ACCA] 
is that ... it generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the 
statutory definition of the prior offense."); see also United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 683 
(1989) ("The supporters of the legislation cannot have contemplated an interpretation of the 
statute which required for its application anything but a straightforward process. 'Ordinarily, 
the proof will be in the form of certified court records •••. ' "). 
52. See, e.g., S. KLEIN & M CAGGIANO, supra note 13, at 37 (summarizing results of five 
predictive models). 
53. See, e.g., M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3, at 64 (examining residential and school moves, 
education levels, I.Q., race, and socioeconomic status). 
54. See J. PETERSILIA & s. TURNER, GUIDELINE· BASED JUSTICE 26 (1985) (the most accu-
rate and sophisticated models achieve no better than 70% accuracy). 
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models. The reasons for the narrower inquiry have as much to do 
with fairness as accuracy. 
In 1984, Congress conducted hearings on the bills that would be-
come the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984.55 The definition and 
scope of the career criminal problem, the leverage feature, resource 
allocation issues, and predicate offense issues dominated the hearings; 
methods for identifying career criminals did not figure prominently in 
the discussion.56 The American Bar Association (ABA) witness, 
however, testified on the identification issue at some length. The ABA 
witness, generally opposed to the ACCA, stated that scientific at-
tempts to predict commission of specific dangerous crimes pose high 
risks of false positives, but conceded that "recidivism in general is 
often predictable."57 To identify proper subjects for sentence enhance-
ment, the ABA recommended, courts should use a criminal history 
test rather than "clinical or diagnostic"58 evaluations: "[T]he ten-
dency toward overprediction in the clinical diagnosis of dangerousness 
makes past criminal conduct the best and/airest guide to the determi-
nation of whom to incapacitate for an extended period .... "59 
The ABA did not here assert any superior predictive accuracy in a 
conviction history test, but argued rather that such a test was more 
fair. 60 The ACCA could have been written to direct judges to put all 
convicted felons - not just those with three prior offenses - through 
a battery of tests to "diagnose" the offender as a career criminal. To 
avoid increased incarceration, the offender would have had to satisfy 
the model designed by the diagnostician. The disadvantages of this 
approach are twofold. First, scientific studies find that factors outside 
the subjects' criminality - education, poverty, employment, and sub-
stance abuse, for example - correlate positively to recidivism. 61 Such 
factors introduce race and class bias into recidivism decisions. 62 Sec-
ond, as noted above, models of this sort fail to predict recidivism with 
high accuracy. Broad clinical analysis makes sentence enhancement 
55. See Hearings, supra note 2 (hearings on H.R. 1627 and S. 52, House and Senate versions 
of the ACCA). 
56. See generally id. 
57. Id. at 95 n.31. 
58. Id. at 95. 
59. Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
60. The ABA would also have increased the fairness of the ACCA by building in incremental 
increases in punishment proportional to the number or quality of prior offenses. Id. at 79, 85. 
The ACCA left the amount of any incremental increase above the minimum to the judge by 
specifying only a broad sentencing range of 15 years to life. By comparison, the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines specify incremental increases for each prior offense. See supra note 15; infra Part 
III. 
61. See J. PETERSILIA & S. TuRNER, supra note 54, at 25-27; see also M. WOLFGANG, supra 
note 3, at 64. 
62. See J. PETERSILIA & S. TuRNER, supra note 54, at 25 (Considering factors such as educa-
tion, employment, and substance abuse introduces race and class bias into recidivism decisions.). 
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turn not just on the defendant's behavior, but also on the diagnosti-
cian's mistakes and biases. 
In contrast, the ACCA as written identifies career criminals based 
solely on their own behavior. To avoid increased incarceration, the 
offenders need only commit less than three felonies or not possess a 
firearm. The latter approach proves "self-effectuating,"63 and thus 
more fair than the former. The ACCA does not turn on factors 
outside the defendant's volition. 
The ABA's rationale for choosing a narrowly written criminal his-
tory test, unfortunately, is neither fully developed nor debated in the 
history. Indeed, the identification issue was largely ignored in the dis-
cussion. Congress may well have chosen the narrower approach sim-
ply because it is cheaper and more certain. Regarding accuracy, 
however, the equity rationale put to Congress by the ABA reasonably 
explains the choice to consider less, rather than more information. 64 
In sum, Congress was aware of the advantages and disadvantages 
of broad versus narrow inquiry. The ABA recommended confining 
the inquiry to the conviction record on grounds of equity. Broader 
inquiry permits factfinders to introduce undesirable biases into the 
identification process, gaining thereby only marginal improvements in 
accuracy. A test considering less, but more certain, information is also 
easier to administer than a more complex analysis. These reasons sug-
gest conviction counting analysis should focus narrowly on the fact 
and timing of prior convictions for serious offenses, to the exclusion of 
other indicators of "career criminal" status. One such indicator, un-
mentioned in the ACCA but difficult for courts to ignore, is the extent 
to which the defendant has demonstrated that further rehabilitation 
would be useless. Section C examines this point in detail. 
C. The Sequence of Offenses and Convictions 
Early drafts of the ACCA contemplated that defendants would 
qualify for sentence enhancement only if they committed a third predi-
cate offense, while armed, after having already been convicted of two 
offenses: "Those career criminals with two or more prior convictions 
for robbery or burglary who then carry a firearm while committing yet 
another robbery or burglary will be eligible for prosecution in Federal 
court [under the ACCA]."65 State and local prosecutors balked at fed-
63. Concomitantly, the ABA would have limited the risks of inaccuracy by proportionately 
increasing the incapacitative sentence by some specific percentage for each additional prior con-
viction. See supra note 60. 
64. See supra note 6 (text of ACCA limits consideration to the number, type, and timing of 
prior offenses). 
65. S. REP. No. 190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (emphasis added) (earlier draft of ACCA, 
S. 52); see also S. 1688, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 127 CoNG. REc. 26,449 (1981) 
(defining career criminals as those who commit robbery or burglary "after having been twice 
convicted of [a robbery or burglary felony]"). 
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eral prosecution of the traditionally local crimes of robbery and bur-
glary. 66 The ACCA as it eventually emerged alleviated that concern, 
since, under the enacted version, only the federal offense of illegal pos-
session of a firearm is tried in federal court. 67 The total number of 
predicate felonies remained at three, the same as in earlier versions. 
The version of the ACCA finally enacted does not specify, as ear-
lier drafts had, that at least two of the prior convictions must precede 
commission of the third predicate offense. 68 Under earlier versions of 
the bill, the Third Circuit has noted, "three burglaries on the same 
night could not possibly subject a defendant to the fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum."69 Earlier versions thus required intervening 
convictions 70 between countable offenses: 
Given the narrow focus of the bill [on career criminals], the most reason-
able interpretation would be to require the same relationship [as in the 
earlier drafts of the bill]. That is, the first conviction must have been 
rendered before the second crime was committed. The bill was aimed at a 
small number of hard-core offenders, and was explicitly motivated by 
concerns that some state courts operated as a "revolving door."71 
This interpretation reasonably construes the earlier draft. The enacted 
version, however, does not imply that each offense must follow a prior 
conviction. The ACCA simply requires that three prior convictions 
precede the firearm possession offense.72 Moreover, given the most 
recent amendment to the ACCA, interpreting the ACCA to require 
intervening convictions seems plainly wrong. 
In 1988, Congress amended the ACCA to add the proviso that the 
three predicate offenses must have been "committed on occasions dif-
ferent from one another."73 The amendment appears to have been 
66. H.R. REP. No. 1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CoNG. & 
AoMIN. NEWS 3661, 3664-65 (1984); see also United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 679-81 
(3d Cir. 1989) (discussing federalism concerns attending early drafts of ACCA). 
67. Originally codified alongside the ACCA at 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (Supp. 1985), the 
federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
(1988). See text of§ 922(g), supra note 8. 
68. See Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 681 (pointing to the discrepancy). 
69. 873 F.2d at 681 (citing S.1688, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 127 CoNG. REc. 26,449 
(1981)). 
70. See infra section II.B.3 (discussing the Third Circuit's "intervening convictions" ap-
proach in United States v. Ba/ascsak). 
71. Ba/ascsak, 873 F.2d at 682 (quoting S. REP. No. 190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6). 
72. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). It is not clear from the record that Congress changed the 
earlier language for conviction counting purposes. The relevant text was probably redrafted only 
to alleviate federalism concerns. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. The enacted 
version added a federal crime, felony firearm possession, supra note 8, so that traditionally local 
crimes (e.g., burglary) would not be tried in federal court; that idea had troubled state prosecu-
tors. The ACCA kept the total number of substantive prior offenses the same (three) as in earlier 
versions. The enacted version, supra note 6, simply requires all three prior convictions to have 
been committed before the federal firearm offense. 
73. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (1988) 
(amending the ACCA). 
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drafted in direct response to United States v. Petty, 14 where the court 
counted separately six convictions stemming from the simultaneous 
robbery of six restaurant patrons. Explaining the change intended by 
the amendment, the Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, Senator 
Joseph Biden, explained: 
Under the amendment, the three previous convictions would have to be 
for offenses "committed [on] occasions different from one another." 
Thus, a single multicount conviction could still qualify where the counts 
related to crimes committed on different occasions, but a robbery of mul-
tiple victims simultaneously (as in Petty) would count as only one con-
viction. This interpretation plainly expresses that concept of what is 
meant by a "career criminal," that is, a person who over the course of time 
commits three or more of the enumerated kinds of felonies and is con-
victed therefor. It is appropriate to clarify the statute . . . to insure that 
its rigorous sentencing provisions apply only as intended in cases merit-
ing such strict punishment. 1s 
As a practical matter, the government routinely prosecutes defendants 
charged with multiple offenses under multiple-count indictments. 76 
Senator Biden's remarks recognize this practice and explain that the 
ACCA requires a difference in time between crimes, but not sequential 
prosecutions. By comparison, under an intervening convictions ap-
proach, offenses treated in a multicount indictment could not possibly 
qualify since the convictions are all returned at the same time. If, as 
Senator Biden explains, multicount convictions can still qualify, then 
it follows that the ACCA may be applied to defendants who commit 
three serious crimes over some period of time, with or without inter-
vening efforts at rehabilitation. 11 
Although the Biden remarks largely discount the "intervening 
convictions" interpretation of the ACCA, they fail to specify how 
much time is required to separate sequential offenses into distinct, 
countable "occasions." Courts diverge in their approach to that 
question. 78 
To summarize, the legislative history of the ACCA has been used 
to support vastly different results. 79 On balance, the history of the Act 
seems most valuable at telling us how it should not be construed. 
74. 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1034, revd., 828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987); 
see infra section II.A. 
75. 134 CoNG. REC. S17,370 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Biden) (emphasis 
added). 
76. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURS 993 
(1990). 
77. Accord United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 687-88 (3d Cir. 1988) (Greenberg, J., 
dissenting). 
78. See infra section 11.B. 
79. Compare United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987) (different times of commis-
sion sufficient), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988), with Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 678-81 (intervening 
convictions required) and United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (continuity of 
conduct and number of victims relevant), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989). 
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First, courts should narrow the reach of the ACCA as little as possi-
ble, since the fundamental principle upon which the Act is based -
affording state and local prosecutors leverage in the form of a swift, 
certain, and severe federal sentencing alternative - would be under-
mined if courts interpret the Act in such a way that many criminals 
know it cannot reach them. Second, Congress rejected extensive, indi-
vidualized fact-finding as a means of improving accuracy and thus 
minimizing the risk of false positives. The ACCA contemplates an 
examination of the conviction record, and little else. The idea of 
broader diagnostic analysis was put before Congress, as were the fair-
ness and proportionality advantages of a criminal history focus; it 
chose the latter approach. Finally, convictions returned under multi-
ple-count indictments can be counted separately provided the offenses 
were committed on different "occasions." Thus, the statute cannot 
logically require intervening efforts at rehabilitation. 
The legislative history does not address satisfactorily how much 
time between offenses, if any, is required to count the convictions sepa-
rately. "Committed on different occasions" means at least "non-
simultaneous,"80 but how far beyond remains unclear. One offense 
may be viewed as happening on an "occasion" different from that of 
another committed five minutes later.81 Five minutes seems like too 
short a career to warrant the consequences of career criminal sentence 
enhancement. The rule of lenity dictates that courts should construe 
criminal statutes, including sentencing provisions, in favor of the ac-
cused. 82 At the same time, application of the rule of lenity "cannot 
dictate an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds with 
the generally accepted contemporary meaning of a term."83 The ques-
tions are whether courts should draw a bright line at all, and if not, 
what the standard should be. 
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO CONVICTION COUNTING 
Courts applying the ACCA count convictions in a number of 
ways. Multiple simultaneous offenses count as a single conviction for 
sentence enhancement purposes. 84 Where offenses have occurred over 
time, however, courts differ in their approaches. Some courts count 
each offense as a different occasion regardless of the time span, so long 
as the crimes were temporally distinct. 85 Others attempt to group the 
80. See infra section II.A. 
81. See supra note 26. 
82. Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2157 (1990) (discussing the appropriate con-
struction of the term "burglary" as used in the ACCA and citing Bifulco v. United States, 447 
U.S. 381 (1980), for the rule of lenity in construction of criminal statutes). 
83. Taylor, 110 S. Ct. at 2157 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49 n.13). 
84. See infra section II.A. 
85. See infra section II.B.1. 
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underlying offenses into factually related criminal episodes and count 
these episodes separately.86 Still others count only offenses separated 
by sequentially corresponding intervening convictions. 87 In all cases 
the courts struggle to avoid under- and overinclusive interpretations. 
The problem arises most often in situations where the defendant 
has three or more prior convictions, but committed some or all of the 
crimes either simultaneously or nearly so. Courts must sometimes 
classify defendants who committed some of their offenses over a period 
of hours or days-multiple burglaries in a single night, for example.88 
Here, reasonable observers may doubt that the defendant makes his 
living from crime, or cannot be rehabilitated, or both. 89 Representa-
tive cases illustrate the divergent approaches to the problem. 
A. Simultaneous Offenses 
In United States v. Petty, 90 the defendant had been convicted previ-
ously of one count of armed robbery in Missouri, and later, of six 
counts of armed robbery under a single indictment in New York.91 
The New York convictions were for the simultaneous robberies of six 
persons in a restaurant.92 Upon his subsequent conviction in federal 
court for drug trafficking and felony gun possession violations, the 
trial judge enhanced Petty's sentence pursuant to the ACCA.93 On 
appeal, Petty contended that his New York prior convictions should 
count as only one conviction for ACCA purposes since he was charged 
under a single indictment and served the six sentences concurrently.94 
86. See infra section 11.B.2. 
87. See infra section 11.B.3. 
88. See e.g., United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), (two burglaries committed 
a short time apart on the same night), cert denied, 488 U.S. 83 (1988); United States v. Petty, 
798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986) (simultaneous robberies of six restaurant patrons), vacated, 481 
U.S. 1034, revd., 828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 
1986) (four burglaries of four separate buildings within a four day period), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 
1322 (1990). 
89. For instance, the defendant's criminal activity might be the product of some unusual, but 
temporary, lapse. In the extreme, the well-worn hypothetical of the parent stealing a loaf of 
bread for the children comes to mind. A more realistic example might be the single drunken or 
drugged night of crime - resulting in three or more convictions for multiple distinct offenses. 
Of course, prosecutorial discretion may filter out many of the most dramatic cases. Whether 
such discretion is a sufficient safeguard against overinclusive application of sentence enhance· 
ment laws lies outside the scope of this Note. For a comprehensive treatment of the general 
subject of prosecutorial discretion, see B. ATKINS & M. POGREBIN, THE INVISIBLE JumcE 
SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1982). 
90. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1034, on remand 
828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988). 
91. 798 F.2d at 1159. 
92. 798 F.2d at 1159-60. While the court describes Petty's robberies of restaurant patrons as 
"simultaneous," it is unclear whether he robbed the victims all at the same time, or one after the 
other. 
93. 798 F.2d at 1159. 
94. 798 F.2d at 1160. 
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Unpersuaded, the Eighth Circuit upheld the enhanced sentence, rea-
soning that statutorily mandated indictment and concurrent sentenc-
ing procedures had no bearing on the essential fact that the New York 
robberies resulted in loss to six different victims and therefore consti-
tuted six different offenses. 95 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether 
the six New York convictions had been counted properly.96 The 
Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for 
reconsideration in view of the position asserted by the Solicitor Gen-
eral. 97 In his brief, the Solicitor General urged that offenses should be 
counted separately only if they occurred at different times, and that 
the statute, properly interpreted, bases the career criminal classifica-
tion on a history of "multiple criminal episodes" rather than multiple 
convictions arising from a single "episode."98 On remand, the Eighth 
Circuit accepted the argument of the Solicitor General, holding that 
Petty's simultaneous robberies constituted one criminal episode: 
"[T]he legislative history strongly supports the conclusion that the 
statute was intended to reach multiple criminal episodes that were dis-
tinct in time, not multiple felony convictions arising out of a single 
criminal episode. "99 
The Petty case stands for the general proposition that criminal 
acts, irrespective of quantity or quality, must occur over time to justify 
enhanced sentencing of the convict as a career criminal.100 With Petty 
in mind, Congress in 1988 amended the ACCA to require that the 
predicate convictions be committed on different occasions.101 In the 
95. 798 F.2d at 1160. 
96. Petty v. United States, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987). 
97. 481 U.S. at 1034-35. 
98. See United States v. Petty, 828 F.2d 2, 3 (8th Cir. 1987). 
99. 828 F.2d at 3. The court vacated the original 22-year enhanced sentence and remanded 
to the trial court for resentencing on the applicable count. 828 F.2d at 3. 
100. See 828 F.2d at 3. The opinion is narrowly written, and avoids discussion of what the 
difference in time between offenses must be in order to properly count the offenses separately. It 
seems wrong that Petty would be any more the "career criminal" had he, for example, stationed 
himself in the restaurant lobby and robbed six patrons sequentially, at distinct times, as they 
happened into the restaurant. However, the opinion, as well as the amendment this case in-
spired, supra note 101, taken literally, may allow just such a result. 
101. See supra note 6. Commenting on the 1988 amendment to the ACCA, Senator Biden 
retold the Petty case history and remarked: 
The proposed amendment clarifies the armed career criminal statute to reflect the Solici-
tor General's construction and to bring the statute in conformity with the other [federal] 
enhanced penalty provisions . • . • Under the amendment, the three previous convictions 
would have to be for offenses "committed [on] ~ions different from one another." Thus, 
a single multicount conviction could still qualify where the counts related to crimes commit-
ted on different occasions, but a robbery of multiple victims simultaneously (as in Petty) 
would count as only one conviction. This interpretation plainly expresses that concept of 
what is meant by a "career criminal," that is, a person who over the course of time commits 
three or more of the enumerated kinds of felonies and is convicted therefor. 
134 CoNG. REc. 817,370 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Biden) (emphasis added). 
Two readings of this commentary are possible. One could infer from Senator Biden's explicit 
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rare situation of truly simultaneous offenses, this principle is easy to 
apply and draws no quarrel.102 
B. Nonsimultaneous Offenses 
Judges disagree on how to apply the ACCA where the predicate 
offenses are committed at different times within a short period. The 
statute remains ambiguous under these circumstances.103 The amend-
ing proviso, requiring that the offenses be committed on "occasions 
different from one another," may allow even minor differences in time 
between offenses to trigger the ACCA.104 In contrast, the standard 
urged by the Solicitor General in the Petty case, requiring three or 
more "multiple criminal episodes, " 105 plausibly suggests that a spree of 
criminal activity, in which several offenses are committed over ape-
riod of time, but are in some sense connected, should not trigger the 
ACCA.106 Not surprisingly, in cases involving connected offenses, 
courts resolve the ambiguity with inconsistent results. Some courts 
rely on the distinction in time and enhance the sentence. Others, how-
ever, consider nontemporal linkages between offenses or require inter-
vening convictions before enhancing the sentence.101 
1. Distinct in Time 
In United States v. Wicks, 108 the defendant had three prior bur-
glary convictions, two of them for burglaries committed on the same 
night.109 Wicks was convicted for the two same-night burglaries 
under a single indictment and served concurrent sentences. 110 The 
reference to Petty that any measurable difference in time between offenses, that is, any non· 
simultaneous offenses, should count toward career criminal status. On the other hand, Senator 
Biden's statement that single multicount convictions "could still qualify" when the offenses are 
committed "on different occasions," "over the course of time," could mean that such a pattern of 
convictions may, but does not necessarily have to be counted, as in circumstances where the 
defendant appears not to be a "career criminal." Id. (emphasis added). 
102. The 1988 amendment clearly means that simultaneous offenses, as illustrated by Petty, 
count as a single conviction for ACCA purposes. As might be expected, the much more common 
situation is that in which the offenses are distinct, but close in time. As shown infra in section 
Il.B.1, the correct approach in these cases is not clear. Petty nonetheless bears on the "non· 
simultaneous" conviction counting problem because, among other things, it acknowledges the 
difficulty of articulating a standard to capture "that concept of what is meant by 'career crimi· 
nal.'" 134 CoNG. REc. S17,370 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Biden). 
103. See supra note 26 ("occasions" susceptible to different interpretations). 
104. Id. This construction supports the approach taken by the court in United States v. 
Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988), discussed infra at section 
11.B.l. 
105. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
106. This is essentially the approach taken by the court in United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 
880 (2d Cir. 1989), discussed infra at section 11.B.2. 
107. See infra sections 11.B.2 and 11.B.3. 
108. 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988). 
109. 833 F.2d at 193. 
110. 833 F.2d at 193. 
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trial court counted the convictions separately. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, reasoning that, although close in time, the two burglaries were 
committed at "two different places at two different times."111 The 
Court of Appeals distinguished Petty on the ground that, in Petty, the 
convictions were for "simultaneous" rather than "distinct in time" of-
fenses.112 Wicks' mechanical ruling suggests that any difference in 
time between crimes, even a few hours, meets the "multiple criminal 
episodes . . . distinct in time" requirement adopted in Petty. 113 The 
Wicks majority relied on this temporal distinction for its result, but 
also noted the differences in location and victims between offenses.114 
The majority explicitly rejected Wicks' argument that the statute 
should not be applied because he had only been punished, in effect, 
twice, and therefore did not demonstrate the resistance to rehabilita-
tion that the statute aimed to treat. 115 In a dissent, however, Judge 
Pregerson agreed with Wicks. He argued that the court should not 
construe the statute literally in view of the evidence of a legislative 
intent to target "individuals who are resistant to society's efforts at 
rehabilitation."116 Judge Pregerson would have required something 
more than mere evidence of three convictions to find offenses distinct 
in time. 117 
The majority's "distinct in time" approach essentially interprets 
language such as "different occasions" and "multiple episodes" to 
mean simply "nonsimultaneous." This approach can impose harsh 
sentences even in cases where all three prior offenses were committed 
within hours of one another.118 As evidence of "career criminal" sta-
tus, such a fact pattern differs dramatically from the case where the 
offenses occur over a long period of time and more convincingly 
demonstrate a criminal career.119 Where the defendant's prior convic-
tion history consists of only three offenses in the same night, 120 a rigid 
111. 833 F.2d at 194. 
112. See 833 F.2d at 194 (arguing that distinctions in time alone can satisfy the criminal 
episodes test). 
113. 833 F.2d at 194. 
114. 833 F.2d at 194. 
115. 833 F.2d at 193. 
116. 833 F.2d at 195 (Pregerson, J. dissenting); see infra section 11.B.3. (discussing the Third 
Circuit's intervening-convictions approach). 
117. 833 F.2d at 194-95; see also supra note 50 (discussing Judge Pregerson's use of the 
legislative history). 
118. See 833 F.2d at 194. Under the court's reasoning, Wicks would just as propedy have 
received an enhanced sentence had all three of his burglaries been committed minutes apart in 
adjacent buildings. It is doubtful that Congress intended such a brief period of criminal activity 
to result in armed career criminal treatment. See 833 F.2d at 195 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
119. See 833 F.2d at 195 (Pregerson, J. dissenting) ("The title of the Act indicates that it was 
aimed at career criminals, rather than those who merely commit three punishable acts. . . • More 
was required."). 
120. See United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 683 (3d Cir. 1989) ("We could hardly 
attribute to Congress the intention of branding someone a career criminal offender who, for 
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"distinct in time" approach is overinclusive. This concern, however, 
diminishes where only a portion of the prior offenses appear related. 
For example, two burglaries in one night, followed by two more sev-
eral months later, fairly undercut the notion of an isolated spree. 
2. Multiple Criminal Episodes 
In United States v. Towne, 121 the Second Circuit rejected the 
mechanical approach of the Wicks majority and attempted to group 
offenses into "criminal episodes." In 1976, Towne was convicted on 
two felony counts of kidnapping, and later sexually assaulting, a single 
victim.122 Then, in 1983, in exchange for the dropping of an outstand-
ing 1979 New Hampshire rape charge, Towne pled guilty in Vermont 
to two counts of sexual assault and kidnapping, again committed upon 
a single victim.123 In 1986, Towne was the prime suspect in the disap-
pearance of a fifteen-year-old girl; the investigation of that crime led to 
his arrest and conviction on felony firearms charges.124 The trial court 
enhanced Towne's sentence under the ACCA, counting the sexual as-
saults and kidnappings as four separate convictions.125 
On appeal, the government argued that the lower court had 
counted Towne's four convictions properly because kidnapping and 
rape "have very different elements, protect discrete interests, [and] do 
not inevitably occur together."126 The Second Circuit rejected this ar-
gument, holding: 
[U]nder the circumstances of this case, in each instance the kidnap· 
ping and rape offenses were part of a continuous course of conduct which 
was directed against a single victim .... [U]nlike other cases cited by the 
appellee, where a convicted defendant had committed separate crimes 
against separate victims in separate locations [Wicks and Greene cited] 
we consider each of these two attacks to be a single criminal episode.127 
Having determined that only two criminal episodes existed in these 
facts, the court vacated the portion of the lower court's ruling enhanc-
ing Towne's sentence under the ACCA.12s 
example, committed several separate felonies during a single drunken spree, with no time to 
sober up and reconsider between the separate incidents."). 
121. 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989). 
122. 870 F.2d at 889. 
123. 870 F.2d at 882. 
124. 870 F.2d at 882-83. 
125. 870 F.2d at 888-89. 
126. 870 F.2d at 891 (quoting the U.S. Attorney for the District of Vermont). 
127. 870 F.2d at 891. 
128. 870 F.2d at 891. Much of the difficulty with this decision lies in the language used to 
explain the result. Hypothetically, Towne might have, on one of the occasions, in the same 
period of time, kidnapped not one, but two women (at the same time) and later sexually assaulted 
them both. There would be two victims then, as opposed to a "single victim," but it is not clear 
what light that sheds on Towne's status as a "career criminal." Similarly, suppose the abductee 
escaped before Towne could assault her, but he returned several hours, or days, or weeks later, 
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By comparison, the Wicks opinion suggests enhancement would 
have been appropriate, since Towne committed his offenses at different 
times and locations.129 Further, although Wicks presents overinclu-
sion risks by looking only to the fact of nonsimultaneous convictions, 
the Towne court's refusal to enhance the sentence for multiple offenses 
against a single victim presents underinclusion problems.130 The 
Towne approach looks beyond the fact and timing of convictions to the 
facts underlying the convictions, deciding on its own their relevance to 
whether the defendant is a career criminal.131 
In effect, Towne reintroduces discretion into the sentencing deci-
sion by leaving the boundaries and rules of the "episode" inquiry to 
the judge. The court can circumvent Congress' standard by choosing 
and then assaulted her. Such circumstances change the "single prolonged attack" characteriza-
tion, but would hardly show Towne to be any more of a "career criminal" than he was in his 
actual attacks. 
129. Compare United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 831 (1988) with Towne, 870 F.2d at 891. Because Towne, like Wicks, committed two differ-
ent offenses (kidnapping and sexual assault) at two different places (the site of the abduction 
versus the site of the sexual assault) at two different times (kidnapping, then later sexually as-
saulting his victims), under the Wicks analysis he would qualify for enhanced sentencing. How-
ever, the Towne court distinguished Wicks on the ground that Wicks "had committed separate 
crimes against separate victims in separate locations." Towne, 870 F.2d at 891 (emphasis added). 
The distinction hardly seems dispositive. 
130. The Towne opinion suggests that the court would not enhance a sentence where the 
"offenses were part of a continuous course of conduct which was directed against a single vic-
tim." Towne, 870 F.2d at 891 (emphasis omitted). This portion of the court's reasoning seems 
too narrow, since it is quite plausible that a criminal could make a "career" (or at least part of 
one) out of repeated offenses against a single victim. For example, a burglar might steal from the 
same warehouse night after night, or a bully might beat the same victim time after time. While 
those situations may differ from Towne in the elapsed time between offenses, it is hardly clear 
from the Towne decision that Towne would have qualified for enhanced sentencing had the inter-
val between the kidnappings and the subsequent sexual assaults been separated by a similar 
length of time. Perhaps the rationale behind the Towne opinion is that since there was no dis-
cernible break in the defendant's criminal activity between the time of the kidnappings and the 
sexual assaults the offenses blend together in time. This undifferentiated continuity of criminal 
activity might distinguish Towne from Wicks. See supra section 11.B.1 (Wicks' burglaries were 
separated by a discernible, if brief, break in time between offenses.). Also, the fact Towne's 
offenses occurred with no break in criminal activity may mean Towne lacked the requisite "time 
to sober up and reconsider between the separate incidents" suggested in United States v. Balasc-
sak, 873 F.2d 673, 683 (3d Cir. 1989). On the other hand, he undoubtedly could have abandoned 
his prolonged attack at some time during its course. 
131. Once factors other than the number, type, and timing of the prior offenses enter the 
analysis, judicial discretion figures prominently in the analysis. Since the statute doesn't specify 
any additional factors for consideration, the court decides them on its own. The sentencing 
decision begins to resemble the traditional discretionary approach. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 
44, at 21-25. The Towne court looked at the number of victims and the "prolonged" character of 
the attacks, and declined to enhance Towne's sentence. It might just as easily have considered 
the repetitive nature ofTowne's offenses (similar violent sexual assaults), the fact he had failed in 
an intensive rehabilitation program specifically aimed at sex offenders, and the fact his initial 
crime in each offense (kidnapping) preceded the subsequent sexual assaults by enough time to 
force the victims to drive to secluded locations, affording Towne a reasonable opportunity to 
desist. Discretion applied along the latter lines thus might reverse the results in Towne and 
Wicks. Compare this discretion with the discretionary departure provisions in the federal sen-
tencing guidelines, infra Part III. 
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as it wishes from the plausible reasons for finding, or not finding, a 
single criminal episode. Without statutory guidance, the "episode" 
idea is just as ambiguous as the "occasion" and "career criminal" 
concepts. 
The Towne court approvingly cited the dissent in Wicks, which 
noted that "the title of the Act itself indicates that it was aimed at 
punishing 'career' criminals, 'individuals who are resistant to society's 
efforts at rehabilitation.' " 132 The Wicks dissenter thus hints that 
courts should not restrict their inquiry to the number, substance, and 
timing of convictions, but also should assess how many unsuccessful 
"efforts at rehabilitation" the prospective career criminal defendant 
has been afforded. This idea is central to the third approach to count-
ing convictions. 
3. Intervening Convictions 
In United States v. Balascsak. 133 the defendant was tried and con-
victed of illegally purchasing a gun as an ex-felon. In May of 1981, 
Balascsak. had been convicted ofburglary.134 Months later, in Novem-
ber of 1981, he was convicted of two more crimes: burglaries of two 
different houses one block apart on the same night.135 The pattern of 
offenses closely resembles that in Wicks. 136 Acting consistently with 
the Wicks "distinct in time" approach, the trial court enhanced the 
sentence.137 
On appeal, the Third Circuit declined to follow the approaches 
taken by other circuits and virtually disregarded the 1988 amendment. 
"Distinct in time," "criminal episodes," and "committed on occa-
sions different from one another" [phrases taken from Petty, Wicks, 
Towne, and the language of the 1988 amendment to the ACCA] are mal-
leable standards. . . . We could hardly attribute to Congress the inten-
tion of branding someone a career criminal offender who, for example, 
committed several separate felonies during a single drunken spree, with 
no time to sober up and reconsider between the separate incidents. 138 
132. Towne, 810 F.2d at 891 (quoting Wicks. 833 F.2d at 195 (Pregerson, J., dissenting)). 
133. 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989). 
134. 873 F.2d at 675. 
135. 873 F.2d at 675. 
136. See United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 
(1988). 
137. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 676. Balascsak was convicted under the earlier version of the 
ACCA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). That version did not contain the "com-
mitted on occasions different from one another" language added by the 1988 amendment to the 
current version of the ACCA. See discussion of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1501-09 (1988) 
(amending the Armed Career Criminal Act). However, the Balascsak court was aware of the 
added language at the time it considered the Act's application to the instant case. See Balascsak, 
873 F.2d at 688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). 
138. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 683. The Balascsak court vociferously criticized the Wicks ma-
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The court examined the legislative history at length and decided 
that Congress meant to target a small number of high-rate offenders 
incapable of rehabilitation.. 139 The court adopted the conviction count-
ing method used in most state habitual-offender statutes. Most state 
schemes require that each successive felony must be committed after 
the previous felony conviction in order to count toward habitual-of-
fender status.140 The Balascsak majority held that the ACCA requires 
that each counted offense occur after a preceding conviction.141 
Balascsak's offense/conviction pattern, arrayed chronologically, was: 
Offense 1, Conviction 1, Offense 2, Offense 3, Conviction 2, Conviction 
3. Thus, offenses 2 and 3, the burglaries committed on the same night, 
only counted as one occasion.142 
This approach may often prove underinclusive. Courts taking this 
view will not enhance sentences even if the string of offenses spans 
days, weeks, or months unless it is broken by intervening convic-
tions.143 Absent intervening convictions, the offenses - no matter 
how indicative of a criminal career - do not count separately .144 This 
jority's reliance on the distinction in time between offenses as sufficient reason to trigger the 
ACCA: 
The Wicks majority held that two burglaries committed on the same night in two different 
locations are "distinct in time" and therefore may be counted as multiple convictions. Thus 
the Wicks court would rely on small temporal distinctions without considering the underly-
ing purpose of the statute; precisely the interpretation the Solicitor General suggested was 
improper. 
873 F.2d at 683. The Balascak majority went on to state that a "criminal episode" test (precisely 
the interpretation the Solicitor General suggested was proper) or a "committed on occasions 
different from one another" standard (precisely the language of the 1988 amendment) are 
"hardly more satisfactory" than the Wicks temporal test. 873 F.2d at 683. The court opined 
that these tests would all require an "evidentiary hearing" to "give factual content to the 
phrase." 873 F.2d at 683. Further, in view of the fact that the legislative history suggests that 
proof of the underlying convictions would "[o]rdinarily •.• be in the form of certified court 
records," the court concluded that the drafters "cannot have contemplated an interpretation of 
the statute which required for its application anything but a straightforward process." 873 F.2d 
at 683 (quoting S. REP. No. 585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, at 78 (1982)). Accordingly, the court 
rejected any test which would require it to "evaluat[e] the precise temporal, spatial, or jurispru-
dential relationship between two crimes." 873 F.2d at 684. 
139. Balascsak, 813 F.2d at 679-82. Evidence of such purpose was to be found in metaphors 
such as "revolving door'' and "three-time loser" used in the legislative record. "The sort of 
'three-time loser' which the supporters of the bill had in mind is one who is convicted of one 
crime, then commits a second, and then commits a third." 873 F.2d at 682 (citing S. REP. No. 
190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 6 (1983)). 
140. 873 F.2d at 682 ("[T]he rule followed in the majority of jurisdictions is that each succes-
sive felony must be committed after the previous felony conviction in order to eount toward 
habitual criminal status.") (quoting State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26, 29 (Alaska 1977)). 
141. Balascsak, 813 F.2d at 683-84. 
142. Balascsak, 813 F.2d at 684. 
143. In essence, the Balascak approach captures career criminals who are apprehended and 
convicted more frequently, and passes over those who are brought to justice less frequently -
but who are logically as much "career criminals" as the former group. See United States v. 
Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Logically, a person who is convicted in a single trial 
for multiple felonies committed on separate occasions could be classified as an 'habitual offender' 
or 'career criminal.' "), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070 (1989). 
144. The concurring judge in Balascsak pointed out that several offenses without intervening 
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approach might pass over bona fide career criminals who are success-
ful in avoiding convictions for long periods of time. Many of the most 
dangerous career criminals - mob bosses, drug kingpins, and master 
thieves, for example - whose long patterns of crime often come to 
light only after lengthy investigations which culminate in multicount 
indictments, would escape enhanced sentencing, while their clumsier, 
more exposed, more easily caught underlings would not. t4s 
Even more problematically, the Balascsak approach all but re-
writes the present version of the statute. Congress could easily have 
included an intervening convictions scheme modeled on state habitual-
offender laws in the ACCA had it wished to do so. Yet the text of the 
statute requires simply that the offenses be committed on different oc-
casions, and suggests that Congress wanted a much more inclusive 
rule than state schemes provide.146 
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Balascsak amplify the 
differences between the majority's intervening convictions standard, 
the multiple episodes approach, and the distinct in time approach. 
Judge Becker's concurring opinion urges the multiple criminal epi-
sodes approach. He argues that the "intervening convictions" ap-
proach goes too far, but that the "criminal episode requirement must 
be read rigorously and that we must insist that the government prove 
convincingly that the crimes (and the episodes of which they were 
part) were truly separate." 147 Judge Becker recognized, however, the 
convictions could demonstrate career criminal status sufficient to trigger the Act. 873 F.2d at 
684-85 (Becker, J., concurring); see also 873 F.2d at 687 & n.4 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (point-
ing out that labels such as "career criminal" and "repeat offender" apply equally "to those who 
commit three crimes without any intervening convictions as to those who go through the judicial 
and penal systems between crimes," and that the majority's "reconstruction" of the ACCA 
would have the wrong effect of allowing felons who are repeatedly arrested, but whose prosecu-
tions are delayed, to avoid enhanced sentencing). 
145. This possibility is similar to that mentioned by Judge Greenberg in his dissent - the 
repeated arrest, delayed prosecution anomaly. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 687 & n.4 (Greenberg, J., 
dissenting). 
146. See supra section I.A. The intent for the ACCA to operate in part as a tough federal 
"lever'' that could be used to expedite the plea process in state courts implies that the defendant 
should find his options under state law relatively attractive when compared with the federal 
alternative. State schemes, moreover, are often criticized as ineffective, in part because they tend 
to capture the less serious, more easily caught offenders whose offense/conviction patterns more 
quickly ripen into the requisite sequence of three pairs. See ABA STANDARDS,§ 18-4.4, at 280-
81. Reliance on analogies to state habitual offender statutes to interpret the ACCA proves un-
persuasive. If Congress "drew on" the state habitual-offender statutes, it could have attached a 
similar counting scheme to the ACCA, particularly in its response to the conviction counting 
problem in the 1988 post-Wicks amendment. Had Congress wanted an intervening convictions 
method applied, it could have simply drafted or amended the Act plainly to require intervening 
convictions. More plausibly, Congress wanted a much tougher, more inclusive rule than state 
habitual-offender laws. Indeed, had Congress thought state laws worked well enough, there 
would be no need to offer a federal response to the recidivist problem at all. See supra section 
I.A. 
147. 873 F.2d at 684 (Becker, J., concurring). 
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difficulty in deciding how much time should be required to count 
Balascsak's burglaries as separate episodes: 
I concede my inability to establish a bright line, e.g., as to whether 
two days' or two weeks' hiatus is enough. But developing the law on a 
case-by-case basis and drawing lines depending on the facts is the stuff of 
judging and I would leave the development of the law to that process.148 
On the facts of Balascsak, Judge Becker would not have counted the 
two burglaries separately, since it was "more than possible that the 
two burglaries were committed within minutes of each other."149 
Judge Becker correctly implied that some measure of discretion ("the 
stuff of judging") must operate in close cases to avoid over- and under-
inclusive results. He left unanswered the question of appropriate 
boundaries for that discretion in the ACCA's mandatory sentencing 
scheme. 
Judge Greenberg's dissenting opinion essentially argued for a dis-
tinct-in-time interpretation. He noted that the labels quoted by the 
majority, "career criminal" and "three time loser," apply equally well 
to those who commit multiple crimes without intervening convictions 
as to those who go through the judicial and penal systems between 
offenses, and suggested that Congress was concerned with both types 
of offenders.150 Judge Greenberg correctly pointed to the 1988 amend-
ment, which added the words "committed on different occasions," as 
evidence that Congress intended the ACCA to apply to those 
criminals involved in repeated criminal episodes, with or without in-
tervening efforts at rehabilitation.151 In keeping with the Wicks ra-
tionale, Judge Greenberg would have counted the two burglaries as 
separate convictions since "the burglaries at issue were sufficiently dis-
tinct in time and place as to satisfy the applicable standard."152 
In summary, the conviction counting approaches taken by the 
courts result in different outcomes when the predicate offenses occur 
closely in time. The mechanical Wicks approach almost certainly 
leads to sentence enhancement and risks overinclusion. The equally 
mechanical Balacscak approach reads so much into the ACCA that it 
proves underinclusive. Between the two, the "multiple episodes" con-
cept articulates at best a hazy standard for grouping or distinguishing 
separately countable convictions, risking inconsistent outcomes and 
reintroducing a large measure of judicial discretion into the sentencing 
process. 
The same conviction counting issues and problems presented by 
the ACCA have surfaced in the development and implementation of 
148. 873 F.2d at 685 (Becker, J., concurring). 
149. 873 F.2d at 684-85 (Becker, J., concurring). 
150. 873 F.2d at 687 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). 
151. 873 F.2d at 688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). 
152. 873 F.2d at 688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). 
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the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' "career offender" sentence en-
hancement provisions. The Guidelines may offer useful insights for 
interpreting the ACCA. 
Ill COUNTING CONVICTIONS UNDER THE "CAREER OFFENDER" 
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
This Part examines the treatment of "career offenders" under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. It briefly examines the basic operation 
of the Guidelines and the Guidelines' career offender provision. It 
then analyzes the Guidelines' conviction counting method and the ap-
plication of the method by the federal courts. This Part concludes 
that conviction counting under the Guidelines improves upon each of 
the various approaches taken under the ACCA. 
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
The ACCA represents only one of a number of major federal crim-
inal law reforms enacted in 1984. The Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984,153 of which the ACCA was a part, also contained the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,154 which established the United 
States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission). The Sen-
tencing Commission develops the Guidelines and policy statements, 
both of which are binding in federal courts.155 The Guidelines replace 
the former discretion-based federal sentencing scheme156 with a sys-
tem of prescribed sentencing ranges based on specified "offense behav-
ior" and "offender characteristics."157 Briefly, the Guidelines employ 
a "sentencing table," a matrix of incremental sentencing ranges which 
increase in proportion to the combined weight of the "offense level" of 
153. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984). 
154. Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1988, 2017 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59 
(1988); 28 u.s.c. §§ 994-98 (1988)). 
155. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 
4 (West Supp. 1991), discussed supra note 15. 
156. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 44, at 5-6, 118-119 (criticizing the extreme disparity 
in sentencing attributable to judicial discretion and proposing guidelines developed by a sentenc-
ing commission as a remedy); Note, Sentence Enhancement Based on Unconstitutional Prior Con-
victions, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1373 (1989) (distinguishing discretionary from mandatory 
sentencing schemes). Congress expressly found that the then-existing sentencing scheme often 
did not "accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense," and implicitly that it often did not 
produce appropriate sentences for violent offenders. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(j), (m) (1988). The 
tension between the judiciary and the legislature on the issue of sentencing discretion is an old 
and recurring theme in the criminal law. See United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining the move to Guideline-based sentencing as a "pendulum swing" away from the for-
mer discretion-based model, a recurrent theme in criminal law reform). 
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (c), (d) (1988); see also Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § IA (West 
Supp. 1991) (introductory commentary explaining the need for the Guidelines and how they 
generally operate); Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988) (explaining the background, promulgation, and op-
eration of the Guidelines). 
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the crime and "criminal history category" of the defendant. 158 The 
sentencing judge may depart from the guideline range in very few 
cases; the Guidelines thus greatly curtail judicial discretion from ear-
lier practice.159 Furthermore, the sentence ordered is the sentence 
served because the Guidelines also abolish parole.160 
Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to develop guide-
lines that would ensure certain repeat offenders receive prison terms 
"at or near the maximum term."161 Accordingly, the Guidelines con-
tain a "career offender" provision which greatly increases the offense 
level and criminal history category - and thus greatly increases the 
sentence - of defendants who meet the definition prescribed by Con-
gress. Guideline section 4Bl.1 provides that 
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least 
eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense 
of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled 
substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony con-
victions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.162 
The application notes for section 4Bl.1 refer the reader to section 
4Bl.2 for definitions of the terms "crime of violence," "controlled sub-
stance offense," and "two prior convictions."163 For defendants quali-
158. See Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § SA (West Supp. 1991) ("Sentencing Table"). For 
the basic mechanics of how the Guidelines work, see supra note 15. By specifying the incremen-
tal increases in sentence for each additional prior crime, the Guidelines thus contain the propor-
tionality limitations on sentence enhancement voiced by the ABA during the earlier debate on 
the ACCA. See supra note 60. 
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see supra note 15. 
160. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1A3 (West Supp. 1991). The ACCA also eliminates 
parole. 18 U.S.C. § 924{e) (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra note 6. 
161. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988). Incapacitation of likely recidivists is one of the "basic pur-
poses of criminal punishment" recognized by Congress in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984), the parent legislation of both the ACCA 
and the Guidelines. See Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1A2 (West Supp. 1991) ("the basic 
purposes of criminal punishment [are d]eterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and 
rehabilitation"). 
162. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
163. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1, application note 1 (West Supp. 1991). The text 
of§ 4Bl.2 reads in part as follows: 
(1) The term "crime of violence" means any offense ..• punishable by imprisonment for a 
term exceeding one year that -
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 
the person of another, or 
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 
(2) The term "controlled substance offense" means an offense [under a law] prohibiting the 
manufacture •.• or distribution [or possession with intent toward distribution] of a con-
trolled substance . . . . 
(3) The term "two prior felony convictions" means (A) the defendant committed the instant 
offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions [of either a qualifying violent 
or drug offense, or both], and (B) the sentences for at least two of the aforementioned felony 
convictions are counted separately under the provisions of Part A [of Chapter 4]. 
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.2 (West Supp. 1991); cf. ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924{e)(2) (1988) (The 
Guidelines' definition of "crime of violence" nearly mirrors the ACCA definition of "violent 
felony;" The definition of "controlled substance offense," although it does not refer to specific 
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fying as career offenders, judges must adjust the offense level and 
criminal history category above normal levels, thus greatly increasing 
the applicable sentencing range in the sentencing table.164 
B. Conviction Counting Under the Guidelines 
This section examines conviction counting in the Guidelines career 
offender provisions, including the basic test and its application by the 
courts. It then examines the Guidelines' concept of criminal "occa-
sions" and its treatment by the courts. Conviction counting issues 
identical to those presented under the ACCA arise under the 
Guidelines. 
1. The Basic Test 
To compute the number of prior felony convictions under the ca-
reer offender guideline, section 4Bl.1, the judge must use the method 
described at section 4Al.2.165 This section provides in part: "Prior 
sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately. 
Prior sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sen-
tence for purposes of the criminal bistory."166 The application notes 
to section 4Al.2 define the term "related," but caution that the 
method may not work in all cases. 
Related Cases. Cases are considered related if they (1) occurred on a 
single occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3) 
were consolidated for trial or sentencing. The court should be aware 
that there may be instances in which this definition is overly broad and 
will ... underrepresent[] the seriousness of the defendant's criminal his-
tory and the danger that he presents to the public. For example, if the 
defendant commits a number of offenses on independent occasions sepa-
rated by a"ests, and the resulting criminal cases are consolidated . . . 
[counting the convictions as a single conviction per the general rule] will 
not adequately reflect either the seriousness of the defendant's criminal 
history or the frequency with which he commits crimes. In such circum-
stances, the court should consider whether departure is wa"anted. See 
anti-drug statutes as does the ACCA, is also quite similar.). Subsection (3), defining "two prior 
felony convictions" refers the reader to the conviction counting provisions applicable to criminal 
history computation in general. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 4Al.2, 4Al.3 (West Supp. 1991); 
infra notes 165·67 and accompanying text. By comparison, the only conviction counting gui-
dance appearing in the ACCA is that the three prior convictions be for oft'enses "committed on 
diff'erent occasions" as discussed supra Part II. 
164. Because the career offender provision increases the offense level and criminal history 
category, the sentencing range from the sentencing table increases. See supra note 15 (explaining 
mechanics of the Guidelines); see also infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (explaining how 
the career offender provision applies in ACCA cases). 
165. Section 4Bl.2 of the Guidelines, in defining "two prior felony convictions," directs the 
sentencing court to section 4Al.2 for guidance in determining whether to count prior convictions 
separately. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.2(3) & application note 4 (West Supp. 1991) ("The 
provisions of§ 4Al.2 ..• are applicable to the counting of convictions under§ 4Bl.1."). 
166. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4A1.2(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
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§ 4Al.3.167 
By implication, if offenses occurred on multiple occasions, they should 
normally count separately. The statutory language of the ACCA re-
sembles this aspect of the Guidelines.16s 
Further, the Guidelines state the general rule that cases "consoli-
dated for sentencing" are considered related and thus counted as a 
single prior conviction. Assuming that "consolidated for sentencing" 
means sentencing for multiple counts in a single proceeding, and that 
no "departure is warranted," many of the conviction patterns in the 
ACCA cases examined in Part II (those featuring concurrent sentenc-
ing on prior offenses) would not be counted separately under the 
Guidelines method.169 In practice, however, courts have rarely fol-
lowed the general "relatedness" rule where the underlying offenses are 
serious and factually distinct; upward departure from the Guidelines is 
common in such cases.110 
To summarize, the Guidelines presumptively count offenses sepa-
rately only if they are unrelated - committed on independent occa-
sions, arising from separate criminal plans, and not consolidated for 
trial or sentencing. Courts may depart from this general rule, how-
ever, where the defendant's history shows enough dangerousness or 
proclivity to crime to convince the court that sentence enhancement is 
appropriate. The Guidelines suggest courts clearly should depart from 
this rule, for example, where the defendant's offenses are separated by 
intervening arrests. The Guidelines do not mention intervening 
convictions. 
2. Applications 
Courts counting convictions for purposes of the career offender 
provision have interpreted the Guidelines in ways that make it difficult 
to count defendants' multiple convictions as related. To avoid consoli-
dation, courts either find the section 4Al.2 application note nonbind-
ing or invoke the upward departure provisions applicable to the 
Guidelines generally. The following examples illustrate these 
approaches. 
a. Rejecting strict adherence. At least one court has rejected out-
right the Guidelines' presumption that convictions for distinct offenses 
167. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.2 application note 3 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988) (offenses "committed on occasions different from one 
another" count separately toward sentence enhancement). 
169. Compare United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1987) (two same-night 
burglaries prosecuted and sentenced together but counted separately under ACCA), cert denied, 
488 U.S. 831 (1988) with United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1989) (burglaries 
on consecutive days sentenced together but not counted separately since no intervening convic-
tion between offenses). 
170. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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are related simply because the cases were consolidated for sentencing. 
In United States v. Gross, 171 the defendant had been sentenced in a 
single proceeding for two forgeries and for cashing a nonsufficient 
funds check on the same day. Although he stipulated that the three 
offenses were "factually unrelated criminal actions,"172 the defendant 
alleged error in counting the sentences separately for computing his 
criminal history, since the cases were sentenced in a single proceeding 
and thus "consolidated for sentencing." 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit "reject[ ed] that part of Application 
Note 3 that suggests that cases consolidated for sentencing are to be 
deemed related," finding the application notes to be merely nonbind-
ing "advisory commentary."173 The court noted that counting convic-
tions for "multiple unrelated offenses" as a single related case, merely 
because they were sentenced together, would produce results dramati-
cally different from those for identical defendants who were sentenced 
in separate proceedings.174 Such a result, the court ruled, would be 
both inequitable and contrary to the Guidelines' policy of providing 
"honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing."175 Much as 
it had done in the ACCA context in United States v. Wicks, 116 the 
Ninth Circuit counted convictions separately for sentence enhance-
ment, even for offenses committed in a single day.111 
b. Authorized departures. Even if courts do not reject the "consoli-
dation for sentencing" language outright, they may be able to impose 
an enhanced sentence departing from the Guidelines' range. Guide-
line section 4Al.3 provides: "If reliable information indicates that the 
criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of 
the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the de-
171. 897 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1990). Gross was not a "career offender'' case; the conviction 
counting rules in § 4Al.2, however, apply to the normal criminal history calculation required by 
the Guidelines in all federal sentencing proceedings as well as the specific career offender 
provision. 
172. 897 F.2d at 416. 
173. 897 F.2d at 416;seealso United States v. Metcalf, 898 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1990) (sentences 
issued on same day for separate burglaries not "consolidated" since offenses proceeded under 
separate docket numbers without any order of consolidation and were "not factually tied in any 
way"). But see United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1113 (5th Cir. 1989) (adhering to consoli-
dated sentencing aspect of Application Note 3 and counting such convictions as one); United 
States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 279 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). 
174. 897 F.2d at 417. 
175. 897 F.2d at 417 (citing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1A3 (West Supp. 1991)). This 
rationale accords with the fairness justification for the narrow reading of the criminal history test 
in the ACCA. See supra section I.B. 
176. 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988). 
177. See also United States v. Wildes, 910 F.2d 1484, 1487 (7th Cir. 1990) (In computing 
convictions for career offender status, the court stated that "[t]here is something of a mismatch 
between 'relatedness' and whether two cases count as 'two .•. convictions' for purposes of 
§ 4Bl.1(3)." The court did not have to decide whether to follow Gross, since two distinct sen-
tencing proceedings were available.). 
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fendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a 
sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range."178 
"Reliable information" may include information about "prior sen-
tence(s) of substantially more than one year imposed as a result of 
independent crimes committed on different occasions."179 For exam-
ple, the Guidelines suggest that a consolidated sentence for a series of 
serious assaults would warrant departure.180 In effect, this departure 
provision infuses the conviction counting and sentence enhancement 
process with a measured amount of judicial discretion - at least in the 
upward direction - since the judge may, but need not, decide the 
actual sentence based on facts in the defendant's criminal record other 
than the number, type, and timing of prior offenses. 
As the Guidelines suggest, the judge has discretion to consider, for 
example, the fact that a defendant repeatedly committed similar vio-
lent offenses, or has continued to offend despite lengthy prior incarcer-
ation. Thus, while permitting discretion in some cases, the Guidelines 
nonetheless limit the inquiry to "reliable" facts in the criminal history. 
Broad, unguided speculation about the defendant's innocuousness or 
dangerousness is not allowed. A representative case illustrates the 
sorts of facts judges examine to decide close cases under the 
Guidelines. 
In United States v. Dorsey, 181 the trial court imposed a sentence in 
the range prescribed for career offenders even though all the defend-
ant's prior convictions were consolidated for sentencing. In 1982, an 
indictment charged Dorsey with seven bank robberies in two different 
states; he pied guilty to four of the robberies and agreed to sentencing 
in a single proceeding.182 While serving his sentence, he escaped and 
proceeded to rob four more banks in three different states in two 
months. When he was caught, he pied guilty to these four offenses, 
again consenting to disposition of the cases in a single proceeding. 
The last four robberies formed the "instant offenses" in this case.183 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the trial court's sentencing 
of Dorsey as a career offender to 262 months in prison, even though 
the Guidelines generally would characterize the offenses as related be-
cause all his prior convictions were "consolidated for sentencing."184 
Technically Dorsey did not qualify as a career offender under section 
4B.1. The trial court found, however, the case warranted upward de-
178. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.3 (West Supp. 1991). 
179. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.3(b) (West Supp. 1991). 
180. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.3 commentary (West Supp. 1991). 
181. 888 F.2d 79 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 756 (1990). 
182. 888 F.2d at 80-81. Dorsey's prior convictions had been pled and sentenced simultane-
ously under FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a). 
183. 888 F.2d at 80. 
184. 888 F.2d at 80. 
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parture under section 4Al .3 on the basis of reliable facts: the serious-
ness of Dorsey's crimes and the circumstances of his single-proceeding 
sentencing.185 The court of appeals affirmed: 
We do not believe ... someone with a history such as Dorsey's 
should be treated as having only one prior conviction, solely because he 
is permitted to take advantage of Rule 20(a)'s procedural device .... 
This is not a case where a defendant committed multiple bank rob-
beries over a short period of time in a single jurisdiction and was tried 
and sentenced simultaneously for all the offenses.186 
The court noted that, without the procedural consolidation device, 
Dorsey would clearly have met the definition of "career offender" 
under section 4Bl.l.187 The court suggested that upward departure 
might not have been warranted had the offenses been committed 
within a short time span, a principal problem under the ACCA. Dor-
sey illustrates that, sparingly applied, discretion risks little in the way 
of fairness or accuracy. 
Dorsey provides one example of a judge's discretionary power to 
impose enhanced sentences - even as severe as the career offender 
range - via the departure provision in Guidelines section 4Al.3, even 
though the "career offender" definition technically fails. 188 By com-
parison, under ACCA conviction counting approaches, Dorsey's con-
victions would be counted separately under the "distinct in time" and 
185. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text. 
186. 888 F.2d at 81. 
187. 888 F.2d at 81. 
188. Several cases demonstrate the range of circumstances in which the sentencing judge 
may properly depart upward to enhance the sentence of defendants with "under-representative" 
criminal histories. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 901 F.2d 988, 989 (11th Cir. 1990) (like 
Dorsey, upward departure justified where career offender status would have obtained but for fact 
multiple bank robbery convictions resulting from interstate crime spree were "consolidated" for 
sentencing under rule 20(a)); United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 1990) (seri-
ousness and timing of crimes justified departure; prior conviction related to three separate bank 
robberies committed over eight month period), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 997 (1991); United States 
v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78-79 (11th Cir. 1989) (upward departure to 120 months justified 
where crimes of record "substantial in number and serious in character'' even though § 4Bl.1 
definitions of qualifying offenses for career offender status not precisely met), cert. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 1484 (1990); United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 971, 977 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). In all 
cases these courts' exercise of discretion is justified by facts readily apparent from the defendant's 
record. 
Courts disagree over the circumstances in which judges may exercise discretion to depart 
downward - and apply a sentence more lenient than called for by the Guidelines - when the 
defendant clearly meets the career offender test, but the judge believes the criminal history over-
represents the defendant's dangerousness and potential for recidivism. Compare United States v. 
Smith, 909 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (8th Cir. 1990) (downward departure upheld as within judge's 
discretion where judge determined qualifying burglary and drug offenses to have been "some-
what small-time," and committed at early age and within two-month period), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 691 (1991) with United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 549-51 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(neither judge's assessment of underlying robbery and burglary offenses as lacking in "the requi-
site element of violence" nor his opinion that career offender sentencing was excessively harsh 
justified downward departure from applicable career offender range), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2056 
(1991). 
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"multiple episodes" approaches since he robbed the banks over a 
lengthy time (months), and in different states. The "intervening con-
victions" approach would reach a different result. Dorsey's first four 
robberies resulted in a single multicount conviction, and all of his 
postescape robberies preceded his second conviction. Given that se-
quence, the intervening convictions approach would assess Dorsey 
with just two prior offenses for sentence enhancement purposes. The 
prolific interstate bank robber and prison escapee would not receive an 
enhanced sentence. Surely the Guidelines' result is preferable. 
c. The Elusive ''Single Occasion. " Both the Guidelines and ACCA 
use the concept of a criminal "occasion."189 Neither the Guidelines 
nor the cases applying them define the term directly. Under the 
Guidelines, some cases recognize that close-in-time offenses may 
amount to a single occasion. In practice, however, factually distinct 
offenses often count separately, even where they occurred closely in 
time. The Dorsey court, without deciding the issue, noted that sen-
tence enhancement might not have been warranted had he committed 
his offenses within a very short time span, 190 bank robberies on the 
same day, for example. This situation, of course, presents the most 
difficulty under the ACCA. The Guidelines presume cases to be "re-
lated," and thus count them as a single offense, if they "occurred on a 
single occasion."191 The presumption, the cases show, presents no 
great obstacle to enhancing the sentence in most cases. 
In United States v. Jones, 192 the defendant argued that two. prior 
convictions, one for bank robbery and another for an attempted bank 
robbery ninety minutes later, involved offenses which occurred on a 
"single occasion," and therefore the convictions should properly have 
been counted as only a single related case. On appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit upheld the trial court's determination that the offenses did not 
occur on a single occasion since they were "temporally distinct and 
involved two different ... victims."193 This narrow reading of the 
term "occasions" - finding two similar crimes committed minutes 
apart to be different, separately countable occasions - mirrors the 
Ninth Circuit's "distinct in time" approach under the ACCA. 194 Sim-
ilarly, in United States v. Gross 195 three convictions for offenses com-
189. See supra note 167 and accompanying text; supra note 6. 
190. 888 F.2d at 81. 
191. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.2 application note 3 (West Supp. 1991). The ACCA implies 
the same rule, but the term "occasions" is no less ambiguous here than in the ACCA. See supra 
note 26 and accompanying text. 
192. 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 275 (1990). 
193. 899 F.2d at 1101. 
194. See United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 
(1988). 
195. 897 F.2d 414, 415-417 (9th Cir. 1990). Gross appealed the trial court's separate count-
ing based on consolidated sentencing and lost. Apparently, Gross did not make the "single occa-
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mitted on the same clay were, in the final analysis, counted separately. 
In these cases, as in Wicks, the term "occasions" simply means 
distinct events occurring at different times, regardless how slight the 
interval between events may be. The decisions do not give much 
weight to the fact that such brief intervals between offenses might sug-
gest behavior resulting from a one-time impulse rather than recidivist 
tendencies. It is unclear whether these defendants would have suc-
ceeded had they argued their offenses were related components of a 
"single common scheme or plan."196 Under the Guidelines, where 
factually distinct offenses are neither committed simultaneously nor 
consolidated for sentencing, a "common scheme" argument may con-
vince the court that the offenses constitute a single related case.197 No 
reported cases address the point. 
IV. A CONSISTENT APPROACH TO FEDERAL CONVICTION 
COUNTING 
This Part first examines the relationship between "career criminal" 
status under the Armed Career Criminal Act and "career offender" 
status under the Guidelines. Next, it suggests that the rationale for 
examining conviction history under the ACCA and the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines is the same, and summarizes the ways in which 
conviction counting under the Guidelines nonetheless differs from the 
various approaches to conviction counting under the ACCA. Finally, 
it suggests how and why courts should interpret the ACCA to permit 
conviction counting by the same principles they use to apply the 
Guidelines. The recommended Guidelines-based approach is consis-
tent with the text and purpose of the ACCA. 
A. Relationship Between Career Offender Provision and the ACCA 
Until quite recently, no specific Federal Sentencing Guideline ex-
isted for violations of the Armed Career Criminal Act.198 Prior to the 
sion" argument, perhaps because he had already conceded that the same-day offenses were 
"factually unrelated." 897 F.2d at 416. Prospects for success, had he advanced the argument, 
may have been dim in view of the "distinct in time" approach to ACCA conviction counting 
taken by the Ninth Circuit in Wicks, 833 F.2d at 194. 
196. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4A1.2 application note 3 (West Supp. 1991). 
197. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text. 
198. The Sentencing Commission regularly drafts new guidelines and amendments to the 
existing Guidelines and submits these to Congress by May I of each year. Absent modification 
or rejection by Congress, the amendments become effective by operation of law on the date speci-
fied by the Commission, which must be at least six months after submission to Congress. See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 994(0), (p) (1988); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7109, 102 
Stat. 4181, 4419 (1988). 
In 1990, the Congress adopted a new Guideline to cover violations of the ACCA. 18 
U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4B1.4 (West Supp. 1991) ("Armed Career Criminal"); see 55 Fed. Reg. 19,205 
(1990). The text of§ 4Bl.4 follows: 
Section 4B1.4. Armed Career Criminal 
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adoption of the new "Armed Career Criminal" Guideline in Novem-
ber of 1990, persons sentenced under the ACCA were not sentenced 
under the Guidelines199 unless the defendant also qualified for career 
offender treatment under section 4Bl.l.200 Under the new Guideline, 
armed career criminals are subject to various sentencing ranges, in-
cluding potential treatment under section 4Bl.1 as a career of-
fender.201 Just as before the adoption of the Armed Career Criminal 
Guideline, if an armed career criminal qualifies as a career offender, 
the Guidelines increase the mandatory minimum sentence from fifteen 
years, the ACCA minimum, to thirty years, which is the bottom of the 
range for career offenders when the instant offense of conviction car-
(a) A defendant who is subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 
924(e) is an armed career criminal. . 
(b) The offense level for an armed career criminal is the greatest of: 
(1) The offense level applicable from Chapters two and three; or 
(2) The offense level from section 4Bl.1 (Career Offender) if applicable; or 
(3)(A) 34, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or ammunition in connection 
with a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, as defined in section 4Bl.2(1), or if 
the firearm possessed by the defendant was of a type described in 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)•; or 
(B) 33, otherwise 
*If section 3El.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility) applies, reduce by 2 levels. 
(c) The criminal history category for an arm.ed career criminal is the greatest of: 
(1) The criminal history category from chapter four, part A (Criminal History), or sec-
tion 4Bl.1 (Career Offender) if applicable; or 
(2) Category VI, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or ammunition in con-
nection with a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, as defined in section 
4Bl.2(1), or if the firearm possessed by the defendant was of a type described in 26 U.S.C. 
5845(a); or 
(3) Category IV. 
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991). 
The firearms "of a type described in 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)" consist of a class of weapons particu-
larly useful to armed career criminals as opposed to sporting use: "sawed-off" and "cut-down" 
shotguns and rifles, machine guns, silencers, and weapons "capable of being concealed on the 
person" are clearly covered by the section. Antiques and rifled pistols and shoulder-fired arms 
(hunting weapons, for example) are excepted from the definition. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), (e) 
(1988). 
The text of the guideline suggests that the offense level for any armed career criminal will be 
at least 33. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991). The criminal history category 
will be at least Category IV. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4(c)(3) & commentary (West Supp. 1991). 
That translates to a minimum sentencing range of 188-235 months, a range just inside the 15 
years to life range mandated by the ACCA. The Career Offender Guideline, section 4Bl.1, may 
apply in a proper case. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 4Bl.4(b)(2), (c)(l) (West Supp. 1991). The Career 
Offender provision imposes a mandatory offense level of 37 (where the statutory maximum pen-
alty is life, as with the ACCA) and a minimum history category of VI. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 
§ 4Bl.1, (West Supp. 1991). The applicable sentencing range in that case - where the ACCA 
and Career Offender provisions apply - translates to 30 years to life. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § SA 
(West Supp. 1991) ("Sentencing Table"). 
199. See United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing the ab-
sence of a guideline for ACCA violations and calling for the Sentencing Commission to develop 
one), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988). Sentencing under the ACCA, simply was not addressed 
by the Guidelines. Judges attempting to apply the Guidelines to the ACCA defendant had no 
Guideline to apply. 
200. See, e.g., Jackson, 835 F.2d at 1197. ACCA defendants can also qualify as career of-
fenders in some cases. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text. 
201. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991). 
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ries a statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment.202 
Courts freely and frequently mix the terms "career offender" and 
"career criminal" in recidivist cases.203 Intuitively, the two concepts 
seem interchangeable, which suggests any "career offender" possessing 
a firearm is an "armed career criminal." However indistinguishable 
the semantics may be, under the mechanics of current sentencing law, 
the two concepts must be understood as distinct. No "armed career 
criminal" wants to be determined a "career offender" as well because 
such a finding brings an extra fifteen years imprisonment.204 Simi-
larly, few "career offenders" convicted of possessing a weapon would 
want to be determined an "armed career criminal" because such a 
finding could raise their offense level by several orders. 20s 
The actual offense before the court at the time of conviction distin-
guishes the "armed career criminal" from the "career offender." 
Only the offense of firearm possession by a felon206 raises the possibil-
ity of armed career criminal status.207 In contrast, under the Guide-
lines, the instant offense of conviction must meet the "crime of 
violence" or "controlled substance offense" definitions208 to qualify 
the defendant for career offender treatment. 209 
202. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 4Bl.1, SA (West Supp. 1991); see also United States v. Alva-
rez, 914 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2057 (1991) (applying Career Offender 
guideline and thus increasing ACCA minimum sentence to 360 months); United States v. 
O'Neal, 910 F.2d 663, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 
304-05 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3221 (1990) (same). 
203. See, e.g., United States v. Belton, 890 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1989), in which Judge Posner 
used the terms interchangeably to describe the defendant: 
Nothing in the guideline's definition of a career offender requires, however,that every act 
constitutive of the offense underlying his current conviction have been committed after the 
prior conviction • • • • A career criminal is incorrigible, undeterrable, recidivating, unrespon-
sive to the "specific deterrence" of having been previously convicted - and that is a good 
description of a man who continues trafficking in narcotics after having been arrested and 
convicted of a similar crime. 
890 F.2d at 10 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Davenport, 884 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir. 
1989) (Career Offender definition met, therefore defendant was a "career criminal"); United 
States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 77 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing Career Offender provision as a 
"career criminal adjustment"), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1984 (1990); United States v. Jordan, 890 
F.2d 968, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). 
204. See supra note 198. 
205. Career offenders' sentences will be less than if they were also ACCA violators where the 
instant offense of conviction has a statutory maximum penalty less than the life imprisonment 
maximum for violations of the ACCA. See Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1 (West Supp. 
1991); cf. United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing the in-
crease in sentence resulting from ACCA status), cert denied, 485 U.S 969 (1988). 
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988) (criminalizing possession of a firearm by convicted 
felons). 
207. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988) (ACCA applies only to violators of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
(1988) with the requisite prior convictions). 
208. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.2 (West Supp. 1991) (definitions of instant offenses re-
quired for career offender classification). 
209. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1(2) (West Supp. 1991) (instant offense of conviction must 
be crime of violence or controlled substance offense to treat defendant as career offender). 
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A defendant can qualify as both an armed career criminal and a 
career offender under two possible scenarios. First, some defendants 
convicted on firearms charges with histories reached by the ACCA210 
are also convicted in the same proceeding for a violent or drug of-
fense. 211 The latter crime supplies the instant offense required for ca-
reer offender treatment. Of course this scenario assumes at least two 
of the prior convictions count separately under the Guidelines.212 
Second, if the "felon in possession of a firearm" offense, which trig-
gers the ACCA, also qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the 
Guidelines, then the firearm offense can operate as the instant offense 
for career offender classification. 213 This scenario requires at least 
three prior convictions counted separately under the ACCA, and at 
least two under Guidelines section 4Bl.1. Courts disagree on whether 
mere "possession" of a firearm by a felon meets the definition of 
"crime of violence," but several have concluded that possession may 
qualify under certain circumstances.214 In those cases where the pos-
session offense amounts to a "crime of violence," the career criminal 
will qualify for a minimum thirty-year sentence as a career offender. 
Once again, this assumes at least two prior convictions count sepa-
rately under the Guidelines.21s 
Where the career offender provision applies to defendants who also 
qualify for ACCA sentence enhancement, the mandatory minimum 
sentence increases from fifteen years, the minimum under the ACCA, 
to thirty years. The increase arises from the fact that the ACCA has a 
statutory maximum penalty of life.216 The career offender provision 
210. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). 
211. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1196-97 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendant 
convicted of violating ACCA in connection with bank robbery; bank robbery provided instant 
violent felony offense for career offender classification under Guidelines § 4Bl.1), cert. denied, 
485 U.S. 969 (1988). 
212. Cf. Jackson, 835 F.2d at 1196 (defendant's five prior armed robbery convictions were 
separately countable under both ACCA and Career Offender provision of Guidelines, § 4Bl.1). 
Staleness prevents crimes from being counted under the Guidelines, but not under the ACCA. 
Compare United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir.) (Guidelines § 4Al.2(e) pro-
hibits counting convictions more than 15 years old for career offender purposes), vacated on other 
grounds, 921 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1990) with United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 
1990) (ACCA places no restriction on how recent prior convictions must be to be considered for 
sentence enhancement), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1002 (1991) and United States v. Greene, 810 
F.2d 999, 1000 (11th Cir. 1986) (four burglary convictions from 1962 used to enhance sentence 
under ACCA in 1985). 
213. See, e.g., United States v. O'Neal, 910 F.2d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 1990). 
214. Compare O'Nea/, 910 F.2d at 667 (possession of firearm by convicted felon under any 
circumstances is categorically a "crime of violence" within the definition in Guidelines § 4Bl.2) 
with United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915, 917-19 (7th Cir. 1990) (possession of gun where 
defendant used force in struggle with arresting officer is crime of violence, but possession in 
absence of force may not be), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2057 (1991) and United States v. Williams, 
892 F.2d 296, 304 (3d Cir. 1989) ("possessing a gun while firing it •.. is a crime of violence; 
possession without firing the weapon is not"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3221 (1990). 
215. See, e.g., O'Nea/, 910 F.2d at 663, 668. 
216. See supra note 6. 
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pre8cribes an offense level of thirty-seven for offenses with statutory 
life maximums.217 Combined with the prescribed criminal history cat-
egory of VI which applies to all career offenders,218 this translates to a 
sentencing range of 360 months to life.219 Thus the Guidelines in-
crease the ACCA defendant's minimum sentence by fifteen years when 
the career offender provision also applies. 
The table below compares the ACCA and the Career Offender pro-
vision of the Guidelines. 
Federal Sentencing 
ACCA Guidelines 
Statutory Basis* 18 U.S.C. 924(e) Career Offender Guideline 
4Bl.1 
Instant Offense 
Prior Offenses 
Number: 
Type:** 
Relationship 
Between 
Convictions: 
Staleness: 
18 u.s.c. 922(g) 
(possession of firearm by 
felon) 
3 or more 
"violent felony or serious 
drug offense" 
"committed on different 
occasions"*** 
No staleness limit 
"crime of violence" or 
"controlled substance 
offense" as defined in 
Guideline § 4Bl.2 
2 or more 
Same type as instant 
offense 
"Unrelated" or departure 
warranted 
None older than 15 years 
may be counted 
*Both ACCA and Guidelines trace their lineage to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). 
**The statutory definitions for violent and drug offenses under the ACCA and under the 
Guidelines are, for purposes of this Note, identical. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) and 
Guidelines, § 4Bl.2. 
***The phrase is construed and applied by the courts in significantly different ways, as described 
in Part II. 
B. Common Purposes and Divergences 
The Armed Career Criminal Act and the Guidelines count convic-
tions for the same purpose. Both laws are designed to enhance 
sentences for offenders whose criminal history suggests they deserve 
harsher treatment.220 Under both, courts count convictions to deter-
217. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1 (West Supp. 1991). 
218. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1 (West Supp. 1991). 
219. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § SA (West Supp. 1991). 
220. See Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2149 (1990) (characterizing ACCA as a 
"sentence-enhancement provision"); see also Note, supra note 156, at 1380 (explaining that Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines effect sentence enhancement for all but first time offenders). Sentence 
enhancement for recidivists - "career'' criminal offenders - is commonly justified on grounds 
of incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 571 (1967) 
(Warren, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also SENTENCING, supra note 12, at 
187-301; Note, supra note 156, at 1373-74. 
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mine whether and to what degree to enhance the defendant's sen-
tence.221 Thus, conviction counting, whether under the ACCA or the 
Guidelines, serves to distinguish defendants who properly warrant an 
enhanced sentence. 
Although their ultimate purposes are virtually identical, the con-
viction counting schemes employed under the ACCA and the Guide-
lines diverge in practice, leading to different results. The ACCA 
requires that offenses be committed on different "occasions" to count 
toward sentence enhancement.222 Under the ACCA, several courts 
have counted offenses separately where there was only a small distinc-
tion in time between them, such as burglaries committed on the same 
night or on successive days.223 Other courts have placed little empha-
sis on the temporal distinction, looking instead to the underlying fac-
tual relationship between the offenses to determine if they amount to a 
single "criminal episode."224 Still another court has refused to count 
offenses separately unless they are separated by intervening convic-
tions, regardless of the temporal relationship between offenses. 225 
The Guidelines take a similar occasion-based approach, but de-
velop it differently. As a general rule, the Guidelines count offenses 
together if they occurred on a "single occasion," or were "consoli-
dated" for trial or sentencing. 226 The Guidelines, however, give judges 
the discretionary power to impose an enhanced sentence where the 
defendant's criminal record, if assessed in strict compliance with the 
general rule, "underrepresents" the defendant's actual dangerousness 
or likelihood of recidivism. 227 The few reported cases suggest that a 
close relationship in time between offenses does not compel the conclu-
sion that the offenses were committed on a "single occasion" if they 
are factually and temporally distinct crimes.228 Further, as Dorsey 
demonstrates, the "consolidated for sentencing or trial" rule has little 
force; courts may impose sentences greater than the consolidation 
rule, if applied, would produce. 229 
No court applying the Guidelines has adopted any method similar 
to the "intervening convictions" approach taken by the Third Circuit 
in counting convictions under the ACCA.230 The text of the Guide-
221. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988); 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 4Al.2, 4Bl.l (West Supp. 1991). See 
generally supra Parts II and III. 
222. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988); see supra section I.C. 
223. See supra section 11.B.l. 
224. See supra section 11.B.2. 
225. See supra section 11.B.3. 
226. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text. 
229. See United States v. Dorsey, 888 F.2d 79, 79 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 
756 (1990). 
230. See supra section 11.B.3. 
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lines clearly does not impose such a requirement.231 Thus, courts ap-
plying the Guidelines to potential career offenders have repeatedly 
counted offenses separately without intervening convictions.232 
Courts separately counting convictions for offenses committed 
within a short time span have justified their decisions by their author-
ity to depart from the general counting rules in "underrepresentative" 
cases. 233 Thus, they retain the ability to count offenses arrayed closely 
in time as a "single occasion" - and thus, "related" - in cases where 
they do not believe the defendant is so dangerous or incorrigible as to 
warrant an enhanced sentence. By comparison, if judges applying the 
ACCA adhere strictly to the "distinct in time" approach taken in 
United States v. Wicks, 234 even when they do not believe the defendant 
is particularly dangerous or incorrigible, they must impose enhanced 
sentences under the ACCA. Such enhancement would not be required 
under the Guidelines. 
C. Toward Consistency 
Congress delegated to the U.S. Sentencing Commission broad au-
thority to review and rationalize the federal sentencing process.235 
The Commission's ongoing effort produces the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. 236 With the enactment of the new Armed Career Criminal 
Guideline,237 sentencing policy as represented by the Guidelines now 
reaches the ACCA. Given the preeminence of the Guidelines in the 
federal sentencing scheme, and the similar purpose "conviction count-
ing" serves in both the Guidelines and the ACCA, there is a strong 
case for applying the ACCA as consistently as possible with the con-
viction counting method used under the Guidelines' criminal history 
and Career Offender analysis. 
Courts take one of two general directions when applying the 
ACCA. The first attempts to read the statute according to its "plain 
meaning," interpreting the phrase "committed on different occasions 
from one another" to mean simply, and in all cases, "distinct in time." 
Such an approach poses significant problems: at the margins, it un-
necessarily compromises the fundamental sentencing goals of propor-
tionality (treating different cases differently) and uniformity (treating 
similar cases the same).238 The paradigm "revolving door" criminal 
231. See, e.g., Dorsey, 888 F.2d at 80-81. 
232. See supra note 188 (collecting cases where Guidelines were applied without any inter-
vening convictions requirement). 
233. See supra note 188 (collecting upward departure cases). 
234. 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988). 
235. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 
(1984) (relevant sections are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b), 994(a) (1988)). 
236. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § lAl (West Supp. 1991). 
237. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991). 
238. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1A3 (West Supp. 1991). 
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differs in compelling ways from the offender who commits three of-
fenses on a single drunken night.239 Punishing the two offenders simi-
larly compromises these goals, since the cases differ, but the treatment 
is the same. 
The second route courts take when applying the ACCA recognizes 
the difficulty of the "mechanical" approach and searches for some al-
ternative justified by legislative intent. The "criminal episodes" and 
"intervening convictions" approaches exemplify this effort. 240 These 
methods, most notably the intervening convictions approach, inevita-
bly lead to differences between identifying career criminals/ offenders 
under the ACCA and under the Guidelines, even in the same federal 
courtroom. This problem could surface often in the future since all 
ACCA cases are now covered by an applicable sentencing guideline.241 
The Guidelines' approach, by comparison, allows sufficient flexibility 
in these hard cases to achieve the best result. The Guidelines accom-
plish this using generally applicable counting rules augmented by pro-
visions for departure in cases where the judge finds the defendant is 
especially dangerous or incorrigible, and thus deserves sentence en-
hancement. 242 The Guidelines implicitly recognize that the ultimate 
judgment in very difficult cases is best left to judges. 243 
Until Congress amends the ACCA to better explain the intended 
treatment of closely related crimes, courts facing difficult decisions in 
armed career criminal cases should look to the Guidelines' counting 
principles, including the discretionary departure provisions. Because 
Congress reviews and may modify or reject Guidelines amendments 
before they become law,244 the Guidelines represent the clearest, most 
current, and most comprehensive expression of how Congress wants 
the sentencing process - including sentence enhancement for recidi-
vists - to operate. The Guidelines originated in the same legislative 
effort as the ACCA, and their constant revision ensures their current 
vitality. Ambiguous terms, such as "occasions" and "episodes" are 
more likely to be given meaning in the revision of the Guidelines than 
in the ACCA. Importantly, now that a guideline has been specifically 
written for ACCA violations,245 sentencing in ACCA cases may now 
239. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra Part II. Of course, the intervening convictions approach operates just as 
mechanically as the distinct in time method, since it requires no discretion on the judge's part to 
determine whether each offense was preceded by a prior conviction. The adoption of such a 
standard, however, substitutes the court's standard for Congress' completely different one - the 
court's nonmalleable standard versus Congress' "malleable" one. United States v. Balascsak, 873 
F.2d 673, 683-84 (3d Cir. 1989). 
241. See supra section IV.A. 
242. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
243. See Judge Becker's similar views in Balacscak, 873 F.2d at 684-85 (Becker, J., 
concurring). 
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988). 
245. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991). 
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be viewed as a component part of the overall federal scheme, rather 
than as an anomaly. 
The Guidelines also offer a rapidly growing body of federal case 
law that dwarfs that available under the ACCA. Conviction counting 
arises in some way in virtually all cases under the Guidelines, not only 
those involving Career Offenders. Thus, the Guidelines cases offer a 
rich source of facts, problems and solutions for consideration in 
ACCA cases. By drawing on the Guidelines principles, the discretion 
inherent in episodes-type approaches to the ACCA could be applied in 
ways reviewed and approved by Congress. Because Congress specifi-
cally indicates that it wishes to limit judicial discretion in sentencing 
by moving to mandatory sentencing laws and the Guidelines, it makes 
sense to conform to the best expression of those limits. 
The Guidelines suggest several principles that would alleviate the 
confusion and divergence that currently mark conviction counting 
under the ACCA. First, courts should, in effect, presume that offenses 
constitute a single "occasion" under the ACCA when the offenses 
were (1) committed over a brief time span, (2) "consolidated for trial 
or sentencing," or (3) proved to have been part of a "common scheme 
or plan."246 The majority of courts, those that apply the "criminal 
episodes" approach, have essentially already taken this view.241 This 
presumption corresponds to the general rules for counting convictions 
provided under the Guidelines' relatedness principle.248 Importantly, 
this rule must operate only as a presumption. If the rule were hard 
and fast, many criminals, for example those with several prior offenses 
that had been consolidated for sentencing, would know the ACCA 
could not reach them. Criminals cannot be so sure, however, if courts 
may depart from the presumption. The proposal thus does not sacri-
fice any significant degree of leverage:249 only close cases present "oc-
casion" questions, and even then the defendant faces the possibility of 
sentence enhancement. 
Courts should override the above presumption in the same circum-
stances that warrant "departure" under the Guidelines - those situa-
tions where the defendant's conviction history demonstrates special 
incorrigibility or dangerousness. Criminal histories showing the fortu-
itous concurrent sentencing of multiple violent crimes or persistence in 
violent crime after treatment are not the cases that give pause.250 Un-
246. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.2 (West Supp. 1991). In future Guidelines revisions, 
"occasions" could be defined, for example, to mean some discreet period of time, i.e., a day or so, 
affording plenty of time for the criminal to reflect and change his behavior. Defendants with 
several egregious offenses within 24 hours could still get enhanced sentences if the general rule 
underrepresented the seriousness of their history. 
247. See supra section 11.B.2 (criminal episodes approach). 
248. See supra section I.A.; supra section III.A. 
249. See supra section II.A. 
250. See supra section 11.B.2. 
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like the hypothetical three-houses-in-one-night burglar, these defen-
dants do not present a strong chance that the offenses represent an 
isolated incident, anomalous to the defendant's character, and unlikely 
to be repeated.251 Quite the contrary. Here courts should enhance the 
sentence, satisfying any doubts by keeping to the low end of the sen-
tencing range. This suggestion is consistent with the Guidelines' pro-
visions for defendants with "underrepresentative" criminal 
histories.252 In practice, defendants such as Towne253 - a violent, 
repeat sex offender and rehabilitative failure - could be incapacitated 
under the ACCA. 
Finally, courts should not require intervening convictions in order 
to count offenses separately. Neither the text of the ACCA nor count-
ing practice under the Guidelines remotely suggest Congress intended 
such a requirement as a prerequisite to sentence enhancement. As is 
common practice under the Guidelines, 254 defendants with egregious 
records, but fortuitously sentenced in a single proceeding, should re-
ceive enhanced sentences where their records contain reliable facts 
showing recidivism and dangerousness. 
The suggested approach meets the criteria set forth in Part I by 
preserving leverage, keeping the scope of inquiry narrow, and not re-
quiring repeated rehabilitative failure. The suggested approach pre-
serves the leverage function in the ACCA.255 Even where all of a 
defendant's prior offenses were, for example, committed within a short 
time span or sentenced concurrently, the offender could not be certain 
the ACCA could not reach him. The suggested approach threatens 
such offenders because it gives judges the same discretionary departure 
power they have under the Guidelines. Allowing departure improves 
upon the intervening convictions approach, which automatically ex-
cludes these defendants without regard to the severity of their prior 
offenses.256 In intervening convictions jurisdictions, the ACCA poses 
no possible threat to, for example, concurrently sentenced defendants 
with three prior offenses, because such offenders know the court can-
not count their prior offenses individually. The suggested approach, 
by comparison, provides the "threat of prosecution" Congress 
intended. 257 
The suggested approach also keeps the scope of the inquiry prop-
251. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra section 111.B. 
253. See supra section 11.B.2. 
254. See supra note 188 (collecting upward departure cases). 
255. See supra section I.A (explaining the leverage concept envisioned by ACCA drafters). 
256. See supra sections l.C and 11.B.3 (explaining ACCA treatment of offense/conviction 
sequences versus the intervening convictions/rehabilitative failure approach). 
257. Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing how the threat of prosecution under ACCA 
will have a beneficial leveraging effect). 
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erly narrow.258 Courts can apply this standard based on information 
readily available in the "certified court records"259 documenting the 
defendant's criminal history. Courts do not necessarily need to ana-
lyze the particular facts underlying prior offenses,260 nor must they 
attempt any "clinical diagnosis" of individual defendants.261 As 
United States v. Dorsey 262 illustrates, courts can base enhancement de-
cisions on information from the conviction history alone. The narrow 
inquiry accords with the text of the ACCA, which speaks only of the 
number, type, and timing of prior offenses.263 
The suggested approach does not require defendants to have failed 
at rehabilitation on three prior occasions before the ACCA can reach 
them.264 Multiple-count convictions can still qualify where the de-
fendant committed the offenses on different occasions.265 Even if the 
offenses were consolidated for sentencing, and thus resulted in only 
one rehabilitative opportunity, the judge has the same ability as under 
the Guidelines to enhance the sentence.266 The recommended ap-
proach thus permits courts to enhance the sentences of skilled or insu-
lated criminals whose serious offenses tend to come to justice all at 
once.261 
The suggested approach involves a significant degree of judicial 
discretion in sentencing, which mandatory sentencing laws in general, 
and the ACCA in particular, seek fundamentally to minimize.268 
Some degree of "discretion," however, is inevitable so long as courts 
are forced to apply phraseology as ambiguous as in the ACCA to the 
258. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (ACCA contemplates narrow inquiry). 
259. Id. 
260. See supra section 11.B.2 (criminal episode approach considers selected facts underlying 
particular crime). 
261. See supra section I.B (unfairness and error of diagnostic-type inquiries put to Congress 
by ABA during ACCA hearings). 
262. 888 F.2d 79 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussed supra section III.B), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 756 
(1990). 
263. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). 
264. See supra sections I.C and 11.B.3 (Intervening convictions approach requires three failed 
rehabilitative opportunities, although 1988 ACCA amendment does not.). 
265. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (Sen. Biden's explanation of intended applica· 
tion of the ACCA). 
266. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text (upward departure under the Guidelines 
in under-representative cases). 
267. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (underinclusiveness of intervening con-
victions approach when applied to insulated criminals or those skilled in avoiding capture for 
long periods). 
268. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, at§ 18-4.4 (mandatory sentencing laws represent 
legislatures' attempts to curtail judicial discretion); see also United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 
145 (7th Cir. 1989) (Judge Easterbrook explaining the absence of broad discretion in the career 
offender provision: "Criminals aren't entitled to sentences devised by judges rather than 
legislatures."). 
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diverse circumstances presented by the cases before them.269 Further, 
the amount of discretion involved does not significantly increase that 
already at work under the prevailing "criminal episodes" approach. 
Rather, the suggested approach allows discretion to operate as consist-
ently as possible in all federal sentence enhancement decisions. Facts 
that lead to sentence enhancement under the Guidelines will also lead 
to sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Judges can analyze prior 
offense patterns the same way, regardless of which specific sentence 
enhancement statute provides the authority. Finally, the degree of dis-
cretion suggested accords with the optimal level prescribed by Con-
gress in the Guidelines. It is specious to believe that Congress 
intended "armed career criminals" to be identified and sentenced in 
significantly different ways from those used for "career offenders." If 
anything, Congress considers "career offenders" more dangerous; the 
minimum penalty under the ACCA increases if career offender status 
also obtains. 270 If Congress permits the career offender decision to be 
subject to some degree of judicial discretion, surely it approves of a 
similar amount in the ACCA context. 
CONCLUSION 
The Armed Career Criminal Act classifies offenders as career 
criminals if they have committed serious offenses on at least three dif-
ferent occasions. Congress has adopted a policy of incapacitation to-
ward career criminals so identified; the ACCA commands courts to 
sentence career criminals to long terms. Courts struggle deciding how 
to differentiate criminal occasions for sentence enhancement under the 
ACCA because the term "occasions" proves vague in close cases. 
Compounding the difficulty, mandatory sentencing laws aim to mini-
mize the judicial discretion required to interpret the term to avoid 
anomalous results in close cases. 
Both minority interpretations of the ACCA remove judicial discre-
tion from the analysis by relying on either distinctions in time between 
offenses or on the fact of intervening convictions between offenses. 
The former disserves incapacitation policy by its overinclusiveness; it 
wastes scarce resources and results in unjustly harsh sentences. The 
latter can frustrate incapacitation policy by its underinclusiveness; the 
law will not reach many career criminals, and thus fails to protect 
society from these offenders. Because many offenders could not possi-
bly be reached, the leverage function of the ACCA loses much of its 
credibility and force. · 
The majority view attempts to differentiate occasions by grouping 
offenses into criminal episodes. This interpretation necessarily rein-
269. Cf. United States v. Balacscak, 873 F.2d 673, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J. 
concurring). 
270. See supra section IV.A. 
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troduces discretion into the analysis, causing further struggle over 
where to properly draw the lines between episodes. Because courts 
applying the ACCA must exercise this discretion without the benefit 
of clear congressional intent, decisions rendered in close cases may 
prove either over- or underinclusive, and will almost surely produce 
quite different results between different jurisdictions. 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer a solution to the ACCA 
conviction counting problem. The Guidelines enhance the sentences 
of career offenders - fundamentally the same group of offenders 
termed career criminals under the ACCA. The Guidelines, like the 
ACCA, identify career offenders on the basis of the defendant's prior 
offenses. Unlike the ACCA, the Guidelines provide statutory princi-
ples for courts to use to differentiate offenses into separate occasions. 
The Guidelines recognize that, in some cases, strict adherence to these 
rules may fail to capture deserving offenders, such as when years of 
bank robbery offenses come to justice in a single proceeding. In these 
cases, the Guidelines allow the courts discretion to impose an en-
hanced sentence based on reliable facts demonstrating dangerousness 
or recidivism. This guidance focuses the exercise of discretion in a 
way that serves, rather than frustrates, the underlying incapacitation 
policy. Egregious defendants do not benefit from the fortuities of their 
prior arrests or sentencing. 
Drawing on the Guidelines' methodology would alleviate much of 
the trouble with the ACCA. First, the Guidelines would eliminate the 
harsh, much criticized results that sometimes occur under minority 
approaches to the ACCA. To exaggerate the difference in standards, 
imagine a defendant convicted of three offenses committed within 
minutes of each other, and twenty years later found in possession of a 
hunting rifle. The mechanical, "distinct in time" approach leads to 
enhanced sentencing as an armed career criminal; the Guidelines-
based approach will not. 
Second, use of the Guidelines' methodology would improve the 
consistency of criminal history analysis in and between jurisdictions. 
The Guidelines' conviction counting methodology produces a large 
volume of case law to which courts applying the ACCA can turn for 
precedent and guidance. Furthermore, the Guidelines recently 
adopted an Armed Career Criminal Guideline which applies to those 
defendants determined career criminals under the ACCA. Depending 
on the instant offense, the Career Offender Guideline may also apply. 
Applying Guidelines methods in ACCA cases would avoid analyzing 
the defendant's history for the same basic purpose - classification as a 
career criminal/offender - but in different ways. 
Finally, using Guidelines principles fo apply the ACCA ensures 
that judges exercise discretion in a manner reviewed and approved by 
Congress. Since the subject of judges' analysis, prospective career 
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criminals' or offenders' histories, and the objective of the analysis, 
identification of proper subjects for incapacitation, is the same under 
the ACCA and the Guidelines, it follows that the analysis under the 
two laws should be conducted in similar ways. The Guidelines articu-
late the approved methodology in much greater detail than the 
ACCA. Moreover, the continual revision of the Guidelines promises 
further guidance as the case law evolves and the Sentencing Commis-
sion and Congress respond. In close cases, judicial discretion is a tool 
indispensable to the accurate identification of career offenders. The 
Guidelines offer the best instructions for its use. 
- James E. Hooper 
